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Paradigm 
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This Article examines early Supreme Court opinIOns about the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)-the first federal administrative 
agency-in an effort to identify the intellectual roots of the modern 
administrative state. The Article argues that the Court's effort to explain 
and justify the function of the newborn ICC shows the traces of a post-
Enlightenment crisis in the field of moral philosophy-i.e., the growing 
conviction that it is no longer possible for reasonable people to agree on 
what constitutes a true, objective, universally valid standard of 
reasonable or just conduct. From this essentially nihilistic starting 
point, the Court helped to fashion a new post-Enlightenment paradigm 
under which the function of an administrative bureaucracy such as the 
ICC is to impose order on a market consisting of individuals pursuing 
their non-rational interests and preferences in the absence of an 
objective, shared moral framework. The Court thus gave its imprimatur 
to what has become our way of understanding who and what we are, 
namely, individuals who require bureaucratic supervision and 
bureaucratically imposed order as we pursue our non-rational wants 
and needs in market-based interactions with other individuals. Our need 
for some kind of order is the sole rationale for this bureaucratically 
imposed order because, by hypothesis, there no longer exists a true, 
objective, universally valid standard against which any such order can 
be measured. This Article's account of the post-Enlightenment 
paradigm, its genesis, and its implications builds on the work of 
philosopher and social theorist Alasdair MacIntyre as well as on two 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Government by administrative agency has become ubiquitous. The
White House website lists 136 federal agencies and commissions' that
operate in parallel to the 15 cabinet-level departments of the executive
branch.2 These federal agencies run the gamut from the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation through the Small Business
Administration to the Women's History Commission. The first
independent federal regulatory agency,3 the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC"), was established in 1887, 4 meaning that the
administrative government of the United States is largely a creation of
the last 120 years. If, two decades after Appomattox, one had told a
Civil War veteran that his great grandchildren would live in a world
where an army of bureaucrats do most of the work of the federal
government, his response probably would have reflected disbelief, if not
blank incomprehension. 5 The world that has come to seem normal to us
would probably have been unimaginable to him. Even if he had
witnessed the birth of the ICC in 1887, it would have required prophetic
powers to predict that from this single stream the river of the modern
administrative state would flow.
For those of us who are troubled about how we have come to be the
subjects of administrative government, the hypothetical Civil War
veteran presents an important puzzle. How in the relatively short space
of 120 years-less than two modern lifetimes--did we evolve from a
1. Federal Agencies and Commissions, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/
independent-agencies.html (last visited July 29, 2008).
2. The executive departments are Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education,
Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban
Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans
Affairs. See President Bush's Cabinet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/
cabinet.html (last visited July 29, 2008).
3. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts:
The Recent Changes in Louisiana 's Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REv. 431,
437 (1999). For a review of the history of U.S. administrative law prior to the
establishment of the ICC, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative
Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006), and Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the
Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007).
4. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887) [hereinafter
ICA]. The ICC was replaced in 1995 by the Surface Transportation Board. See SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 1996/1997 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1998), available at
http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/docs/ActivityReport 996-1997.pdf.
5. The number of civilian officials in the federal government jumped from roughly
95,000-a large percentage of whom were postal workers-in 1881 to nearly 500,000 by
1925. See James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUBLIC INTEREST 77,
77 (1975).
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world in which a national government dominated by an army of
administrative officials was unimaginable to a world in which such a
government is a premise of our daily lives, a world in which readers of
an article such as this might wonder why or how one could seriously
question the value of administrative government? To put the problem
somewhat differently, how have we come to see ourselves as proper and
even inevitable subjects for administrative oversight, as regulated and
supervised beings? In two recent articles, I argued that this
understanding of ourselves reflects what I refer to as the "post-
Enlightenment paradigm." I suggested that the post-Enlightenment
paradigm influences and perhaps dictates the way that we explain and
justify our behavior and the structure of our social world.6 As discussed
in Part II of this Article, at the root of the paradigm is a fundamentally
nihilistic understanding of our modern situation, a conviction that it is no
longer possible to articulate a true, universally valid, objective moral
theory according to which we can and should live. Starting from
nihilistic premises, we have learned to understand ourselves primarily as
individuals pursuing our subjective interests and preferences through
agreements with other individuals in markets.7 In order to function, the
markets require the supervision of expert, impersonal bureaucratic
administrators.8 Thus, administrative bureaucracies have become a
crucial component of our account of who we are and how we obtain what
we need and want. Because we understand ourselves through the
framework of the post-Enlightenment paradigm, we find it easy and
normal to cede control over our lives to administrative bureaucracies and
we find it difficult to imagine ourselves in a fundamentally different
way-for example, as members of a self-directed community pursuing a
shared vision of the good life. 9 Thus, one might say that the difference
between the hypothetical Civil War veteran and us is that he did not
comprehend the world through the post-Enlightenment paradigm while
we do. To that extent, he inhabited a different world from ours.
If there is merit to the contention that we now explain and justify
our behavior and the structure of our social world through the framework
of the post-Enlightenment paradigm, then the next question is how the
paradigm came to play this crucial role. This Article investigates one of
6. See Mark F. Kightlinger, The Gathering Twilight? Information Privacy on the
Internet in the Post-Enlightenment Era, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 353
(2006) [hereinafter Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight]; Mark F. Kightlinger, Twilight of the
Idols? EU Internet Privacy and the Post-Enlightenment Paradigm, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
1 (2007) [hereinafter Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols].
7. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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the sources of the paradigm in a very specific body of thought, namely
early Supreme Court opinions concerning the ICC. Although Congress
created the ICC, the Court was stuck with the task of hearing appeals
related to ICC decisions and, in that context, providing the official,
legally binding explanation of what the ICC was, how it was supposed to
operate, and how it fit into our scheme of life. To accomplish this task,
the Court inevitably had to provide us with an account of that scheme of
life and of the newborn ICC's role in it. As the Court wrestled with these
issues, it appeared to adopt a fundamentally nihilistic standpoint from
which the post-Enlightenment paradigm gradually emerged.' 0  The
paradigm, in turn, provided the implicit structure for the Court's
discussions of the ICC. I I Thus, the Court ratified the paradigm and
incorporated it into our legal system.
The argument of this Article proceeds in four stages. Part II
outlines the post-Enlightenment paradigm. Although the discussion
draws freely on my earlier accounts of the paradigm, the focus here shifts
to the nihilistic implications of the philosophical debate from which the
paradigm emerged and the importance of nihilism as a kind of
justification for the key elements of the paradigm. Part III provides an
overview of the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA" or "Act"). Although in
1908 Justice Holmes could breezily refer to the "well-known provisions"
of the ICA, 12 it seems likely that those provisions are much less well-
known today; hence, the need for a short summary. Part IV examines the
emergence and significance of the post-Enlightenment paradigm in the
Supreme Court's efforts to explain and justify the role of the ICC in our
scheme of life.
II. THE POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM
My account of the genesis of the post-Enlightenment paradigm for
explaining and justifying human behavior relies heavily on the writings
of philosopher and social theorist Alasdair MacIntyre. 13  The post-
10. See infra notes 318-333 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.B (examining the Court's treatment of the ICC).
12. See Harriman v. I.C.C., 211 U.S. 407, 418 (1908).
13. Key texts include ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE,
WHICH RATIONALITY (1988) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE]; ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY (1990) [hereinafter
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, FIRST PRINCIPLES, FINAL
ENDS AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (1990). More recently, Maclntyre has
begun to spell out the details of an alternative approach to moral philosophy rooted in the
Aristotelian tradition. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS
(1999) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT]. Maclntyre does not refer to the post-
Enlightenment worldview that he describes as a "paradigm" in Thomas Kuhn's sense of
2008]
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Enlightenment paradigm 14 emerged from the failure of philosophers and
other intellectuals to resolve certain fundamental problems that were
bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment critique of earlier moral theories.
The paradigm emerged in three historical stages. 15 In the first stage,
extending from roughly the time of Plato and Aristotle through Thomas
Aquinas and into the Renaissance, there was a high degree of consensus
among thinking persons around a three-part teleological framework for
explaining and justifying human conduct.' 6  The three parts of the
framework were: "an account of human beings as they happen to be here
and now, an account of the end or telos of human life, i.e., the human
good, and an account of the precepts mandating certain virtues and
forbidding certain vices that enable human beings to make the
transition"' 7 from what they happen to be here and now to what they
could be if they achieved their potential. Thinkers operating within this
teleological framework viewed ethics as the science with which we can
study and understand our lives as they are and at the same time inquire
into, and receive guidance on, our ends as human beings and how to
attain those ends.' 8 Within the teleological framework, my telos or good
as a human being is something I share in key respects with other human
beings. It defines me as human and 'distinguishes me from other non-
human beings. Because human beings are defined to a considerable
extent by what we share, the teleological tradition viewed the process of
embodying human excellence in our lives as a shared, communal or
social effort.19 According to the tradition, "we embody in our lives a
series of interconnected roles and relationships, each with associated
precepts about virtues and vices, in and through which we develop our
characters and work to realize the human telos.'' 20  This account of
human beings as essentially social and engaged in a joint effort to
achieve the good also points toward a political ideal that we have in
the term, but Maclntyre's account of the hold that that worldview has on our way of
explaining and justifying human action strongly supports the use of that term in Kuhn's
sense. For Maclntyre's favorable view of Kuhn's general approach, see MACINTYRE,
THREE RIVAL VERSIONS, supra at 17, 50, 118, 122.
14. I have borrowed the term "paradigm" from Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51, 174-191 (2d ed. 1970); see
also THOMAS S. KUHN, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 293,
297, 318-319 (1977). For an examination of Kuhn's use of the term, see Kightlinger,
Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 355 n.9.
15. For a more detailed account of the emergence of the paradigm, see Kightlinger,
Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 355-363.
16. Id. at 356-357.
17. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 5.
18. Id.
19. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 357.
20. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 5.
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common as human beings, i.e., that of a "community united in a shared
vision of the good for man (as prior to and independent of any summing
of individual interests)." 2
The second stage of the intellectual history that results in the post-
Enlightenment paradigm is the Enlightenment itself.22 The story begins
with acute criticisms of teleological explanation from various quarters,
including Reformation theologians, philosophers, and the emerging
community of natural scientists who sought to explain all change in the
world through efficient causes rather than final or teleological causes.23
These criticisms undermined the theoretical foundation for a key element
of the three-part teleological framework in ethical philosophy, i.e., the
notion of a shared human telos or good. What survived was a two-part
account of human conduct consisting of a description of who we are here
and now and various lists of precepts enjoining us to act or not act in
specified ways. The challenge bequeathed to Enlightenment thinkers and
their successors was and is to provide a persuasive, rational account of
how these two elements-unreconstructed human nature and moral
precepts-relate to one another, thus providing a rationally compelling
basis for the moral precepts.24 According to MacIntyre, all efforts to
meet this challenge have failed, including the efforts of such powerful
thinkers as Denis Diderot, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith,
Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill.
2 5
[T]he great Enlightenment theorists had themselves disagreed both
morally and philosophically. Their heirs have, through brilliant and
sophisticated feats of argumentation, made it evident that if these
disagreements are not interminable, they are such at least that after
two hundred years no prospect of termination is in sight. Succeeding
generations of Kantians, utilitarians, natural rights' theorists, and
contractarians show no sign of genuine convergence.26
Enlightenment thinkers and their successors have failed for the simple
reason that it is not possible to identify a rational connection between "a
set of moral injunctions on the one hand and a conception of human
nature on the other which had been expressly designed to be discrepant
21. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 236.
22. For a brief synopsis of the premises of Enlightenment thought, see ARTHUR 0.
LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING 288-289 (Harvard U. Press 1964). For a classic,
critical examination of Enlightenment thought, see ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelln & James P. Pettegrove trans., 1951).
23. Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 357-358 and n.17.
24. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 52, 55-56.
25. Id. at 40-50 (discussing Diderot, Hume, Kant, and Smith) and 62-64 (discussing
Bentham and Mill).
26. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered, in ETHICS
AND POLITICS 172, 181-182 (2006).
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with each other.",27 Since the purpose of moral injunctions is "to correct,
improve and educate ... human nature, they are clearly not going to be
such as could be deduced from true statements about human nature or
justified in some other way by appealing to its characteristics. ' 28
The continuing failure of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment
thought to provide a rationally persuasive basis for moral injunctions
leads to the third stage of the story: the emergence of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm. At the core of the new paradigm is the premise
that there is a fundamental disjunction or discontinuity between the realm
of fact and the realm of value, between the "is" and the "ought., 29 This
premise emerges from the awareness of repeated failures to bridge the
seemingly unbridgeable gap between descriptions of how human beings
are here and now and statements about how they ought to be or what they
ought to do. 30 Over time, "the 'is' comes to be seen as the realm of
'fact,' which is objectively available for study by the natural and social
sciences, while the 'ought' comes to be seen as the realm of 'value,'
which is private, subjective and not open to rational dispute. 31
Maclntyre terms this modem philosophical outlook "emotivism," i.e.,
"the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all
moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions
of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character.,
32
From what has been said so far, it should be clear that emotivism
represents not the triumph but the ultimate failure of the Enlightenment
project to provide a rationally compelling basis for moral precepts and
moral theory. As Maclntyre observes, "what emotivism asserts is in
central part that there are and can be no valid rational justification[s] for
any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence
that there are no such standards., 33  Allan Bloom summed up the
implications of the failure of the Enlightenment project in
characteristically colorful language:
Values are not discovered by reason, and it is fruitless to seek them,
to find the truth or the good life.... This alleged fact was announced
by Nietzsche just over a century ago when he said, "God is dead."
Good and evil now for the first time appeared as values, of which
there have been a thousand and one, none rationally or objectively
27. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 55.
28. Id.
29. Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 359.
30. Id.
31. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6.
32. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 11-12.
33. Id. at 19.
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preferable to any other. The salutary illusion about the existence of
good and evil has been definitively dispelled. For Nietzsche this was
an unparalleled catastrophe; it meant the decomposition of culture
and the loss of human aspiration.... In short, Nietzsche with the
utmost gravity told modem man that he was free-falling into the
abyss of nihilism.
34
As Stanley Rosen observed, "Nietzsche defines nihilism as the situation
which obtains when 'everything is permitted."'' 35 However, if everything
is permitted, then nothing has intrinsic value, and this leads Nietzsche to
emphasize the dark side of nihilism-"the radical repudiation of value,
meaning, and desirability. 36 For Maclntyre, Nietzsche was a central
figure in the collapse of the Enlightenment project and the rise of post-
Enlightenment thought: "For it was Nietzsche's historic achievement to
understand more clearly than any other philosopher.., not only that
what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of
subjective will, but also the nature of the problems that this posed for
moral philosophy.,
37
Although the triumph of emotivism, and therefore of "anything
goes" nihilism, was an "unparalleled catastrophe," the nihilist premises
of our modem talk about "values" seem not to bother most Americans.
38
As used by the emotivist, words such as "values"
seem[] substantial and respectable. They appear to justify one's
tastes and deeds, and human beings need to have such justification,
no matter what they may say. We have to have reasons for what we
do....
34. ALLAN BLOOM, CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 143 (1987). For Nietzsche's
announcement of God's demise, see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA,
in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 103, 124 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1968).
35. STANLEY ROSEN, NIHILISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY xiii (1969). For the
quotation from Nietzsche, see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS
150 (Walter Kaufman trans., 1969).
36. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 8 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J.
Hollingdale trans., 1967). For a brief exposition of Nietzsche's complex views on
nihilism, see HERBERT SCHNkDELBACH, PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY 1831-1933, 166-168
(Eric Matthews trans., 1984). For more detailed discussions of the place of nihilism in
Nietzsche's thought, see WALTER KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST,
ANTICHRIST 97-118 (4th ed. 1974) and KARL JASPERS, NIETZSCHE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
UNDERSTANDING OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL ACTIVITY 242-247 (Charles F. Wallraff &
Frederick J. Schmitz trans., 1965).
37. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 113.
38. For an examination of what Bloom takes to be American ignorance of our
spiritual situation, see BLOOM, supra note 34, at 227-240.
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However, these words are not reasons, nor were they intended to be
reasons.... By some miracle these very terms became our
justification: nihilism as moralism.39
As Bloom seems to suggest, when someone criticizes my conduct or
moral commitments, I may respond that my conduct and commitments
reflect my values. My values are beyond further challenge because they
cannot be measured against any rational, objective standard. Since my
values are beyond challenge, any criticism of them is inappropriate. In
this way, as Bloom suggested, the language of "values," which was
designed to signal the absence of justification, becomes itself a form of
justification. In MacIntyre's view, "to a large degree people now think,
talk and act as if emotivism were true, no matter what their avowed
theoretical standpoint may be. Emotivism has become embodied in our
culture., 40 As emotivism became the common and familiar framework
for expressing moral and ethical claims and arguments, the nihilistic
implication of emotivism ceased to seem threatening. In Bloom's words,
in our post-Enlightenment world, we have "nihilism without the abyss. 'A
Or, as he remarked in another context, "[w]e have here the peculiarly
American way of digesting Continental despair. It is nihilism with a
happy ending.
4 2
The post-Enlightenment paradigm for explaining and justifying
human action took shape in a world where emotivism was emerging as
the most persuasive account of moral life 3 Thus, in important respects,
the post-Enlightenment paradigm is nihilism's happy ending, although
the extent to which the ending is happy is open for debate. The post-
Enlightenment paradigm consists of three elements-the individual, the
market, and the administrative bureaucracy-that have become deeply
intertwined with the emotivist position.44 After Enlightenment thinkers
dismissed the old teleological notion of a shared account of the human
telos and a shared vision of the good, it became increasingly apparent
that all accounts of "the" human telos were in fact simply accounts of the
ends or objectives, the interests and preferences, of particular
individuals.45 According to Maclntyre,
39. Id. at 238-239.
40. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 22.
41. BLOOM, supra note 34, at 155.
42. Id. at 147.
43. For Maclntyre's account of the emergence of emotivism at Cambridge
University circa 1900, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 14-18.
44. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6-8.
45. Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 359-61.
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[t]ake away the notion of essential nature, take away the
corresponding notion of what is good and best for members of a
specific kind who share such a nature, and the Aristotelian scheme of
the self which is to achieve good ... necessarily collapses. There
remains only the individual self with its pleasures and pains.
46
In a world where emotivism remains the only persuasive moral theory, it
is the individual who does the emoting, the individual who expresses
attitudes, preferences, and feelings, the individual who becomes a "kind
of sovereign in ... [a] private realm of value. 4 7
The invention or discovery of the individual48 as the basic
constituent of moral life demanded a new account of human community
or society.49 In place of a shared, communal quest for the human good to
be realized in and through human relationships, we come to see "society
as nothing more than an arena in which individuals seek to secure what is
useful or agreeable to them. 5° As I wrote in an earlier article, "[t]he
model for such a society is the market, which is the second essential
element of the post-Enlightenment paradigm. We learn to see our social
interactions as a form of market behavior in which we each pursue our
individual values and the market distributes whatever we want to each of
us for a price."51 In the market, each individual strives to attain his or her
preferences, which allegedly can be summed up in the seemingly
scientific concept of the individual's utility.52 The individual competes,
bargains, and enters into contracts with other individuals who pursue
their preferences.53 Human society and interaction come to be seen as
consensual or contractual.54  Community is thus negotiated as a
transaction in a market.
The difficulty facing any account of human society as a realm of
individuals competing and engaging in consensual transactions based on
their own values, interests, and preferences is that such a society appears
to face a permanent threat of conflict and chaos. 55 At the beginning of
46. MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS, supra note 13, at 138.
47. Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 360.
48. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 60. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
Practical Rationalities as Forms of Social Structure, in THE MACINTYRE READER 120,
129 (Kelvin Knight ed., Polity Press 1998).
49. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 361-62.
50. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 236.
51. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6 (footnote omitted).
52. Maclntyre argues that the notion of utility as a summing of individual desires is a
"moral fiction" because "the objects of natural and educated human desire are irreducibly
heterogeneous." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 70.
53. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 361.
54. See id.
55. See Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6.
2008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
the modem era, Thomas Hobbes captured this threat in his memorable
claim that the unrestricted pursuit of individual interests will lead to a
"war... of every man, against every man. ' 56 Accordingly, the essential
third element of the post-Enlightenment paradigm is an institution
designed specifically to maintain order by preventing the outbreak of
conflict and chaos. 57 This institution is the bureaucracy. Maclntyre's
account of bureaucracy and its significance in the modem era is heavily
indebted to Max Weber.58 According to Anthony Giddens, in the pure
form of bureaucracy
[t]he activities of the administrative staff are carried out on a regular
basis, and thus constitute well-defined official "duties." The spheres
of competence of the officials are clearly demarcated, and levels of
authority are delimited in the form of a hierarchy of offices. The
rules governing conduct of the staff, their authority and
responsibilities, are recorded in written form. Recruitment is based
upon demonstration of specialised competence via competitive
examinations or the possession of diplomas or degrees giving
evidence of appropriate qualifications. Office property is not owned
by the official, and a separation is maintained between the official
and the office, such that under no conditions is the office "owned" by
its incumbent.5
9
In our era, one finds bureaucratic organization in both private businesses
and public administrations. 60  As Weber wrote, "[t]he development of
modem forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical
with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic
administration.
' 61
Bureaucratic institutions are well-suited to provide the order that
otherwise threatens to disintegrate in a world that consists of individuals
pursuing subjective values, interests, and preferences. This is because
the characteristic function of bureaucracy is objective, impersonal
application of rules backed by the threat of force.62 In Weber's words,
[b]ureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for
carrying through the principle of specializing administrative
56. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 64 (Dent 1965) (1651).
57. See Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6-7.
58. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 74-5, 86, 109.
59. ANTHONY GIDDENS, CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 158 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1971). For a classic exegesis of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, see
TALCOTr PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 506 (2d ed., Free Press 1949).
60. See Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 7.
61. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 223 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Bedminster Press 1968). For a summary of Weber's account of the role of bureaucratic
organization in a modem capitalist economy, see GIDDENS, supra note 59, at 158-60.
62. See Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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functions according to purely objective considerations....
"Objective" discharge of business primarily means a discharge of
business according to calculable rules and "without regard for
persons."
6 3
As Reinhard Bendix observed, for Weber, bureaucratic "organizations
operate more efficiently than alternative systems of administration[,]
and... they increase their efficiency to the extent that they
'depersonalize' the execution of official tasks." 64  Thus, through
disinterested application of rules to individuals and markets (backed by
the threat of force to deter non-compliance), the bureaucrat combats the
disorder that might ensue in the absence of bureaucratic supervision.
Professor White has written that "[t]he art of administration is the
direction, coordination, and control of many persons to achieve some
purpose...., 65 In the emotivist post-Enlightenment world, however, one
cannot hope to demonstrate that the administrative agency's purpose
reflects an objectively true, universally valid, rationally persuasive
standard of conduct based on a shared vision of the good, because such a
standard does not exist. 66 For the bureaucracy, the proper measure of
success is "effectiveness" ' 67 in organizing and ordering individual
behavior according to the purposes that the bureaucracy pursues,
whatever those purposes may be. Where the bureaucracy is effective,
order is maintained, and effective maintenance of order may be the
bureaucracy's one indisputable goal. From the standpoint of the
individual and his or her values and preferences, the actions and
underlying purposes of the bureaucracy may seem irrational and wrong.
Indeed, it would be an extraordinary coincidence if every individual
concurred with every decision of every bureaucracy all the time. In the
emotivist world, however, when the individual disagrees with the
bureaucracy, the individual cannot point to an objective standard against
which the bureaucracy's decisions should be measured. The individual
can say only that the bureaucracy has acted in a manner that is
inconsistent with the individual's values. And if challenged, the
bureaucracy cannot respond by citing an overarching objective moral
standard, because there is no such standard. The bureaucracy will simply
override conflicting individual value systems by whatever means
necessary, including the use of force. Because bureaucracy can maintain
63. MAX WEBER, supra note 61, at 975 (emphasis excluded).
64. REINHARD BENDIX, MAX WEBER AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 427 (Anchor
Books 1962).
65. LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 2
(4th ed. 1955) (emphasis excluded).
66. See Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 6.
67. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 75.
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an impersonal order in a world where values lack a rationally persuasive
basis, it is an institution tailor-made for the era of post-Enlightenment
nihilism. 68 In this sense, bureaucracy makes possible nihilism's happy
ending.
A reader might object that I have misrepresented Weber and the
Weberian understanding of bureaucracy by suggesting that it has roots in
a nihilistic account of moral theory. On the contrary, it is well-
established that Weber was steeped in Nietzsche's ideas and that Weber
agreed in many respects with Nietzsche's analysis of values.6 9 Weber
noted "[t]he impossibility of 'scientifically' pleading for practical and
interested stands-except in discussing the means for a firmly given and
presupposed end. . .. ,70 According to Weber, "'[s]cientific' pleading is
meaningless in principle because the various value spheres of the world
stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other. The elder Mill ... was
on this point right when he said: If one proceeds from pure experience,
one arrives at polytheism., 71 A couple of sentences later, Weber cites
Nietzsche on the irreconcilability of values in different spheres.72 In
Maclntyre's words, for Weber "[q]uestions of ends are questions of
values, and on values reason is silent; conflict between rival values
cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply choose-between
parties, classes, nations, causes, ideals. 73 Weber thus qualifies as "an
emotivist and his portrait of a bureaucratic authority is an emotivist
portrait., 74  He is, in other words, a post-Enlightenment, post-
Nietzschean nihilist.
Not surprisingly, because Maclntyre is a philosopher and not a legal
scholar, his treatment of Weber's account of bureaucracy is heavy on
philosophical roots and light on legal implications.75 To add legal and
historical heft to my earlier articles discussing the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, I incorporated elements of Robert Rabin's detailed
68. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 361-62.
69. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 26. See DONALD G. MACRAE,
MAX WEBER 25, 55-59 (1974) (arguing Nietzsche corroborated Weber's position rather
than influencing it); see also RAYMOND ARON, 2 MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THOUGHT 248 (Richard Howard & Helen Weaver trans., 1967) (Nietzsche as "major
influence" on Weber).
70. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 129, 147 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 148.
73. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 26.
74. Id.
75. One field of legal scholarship to which Maclntyre has contributed extensively is
natural law. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of
Aquinas, in ETHICS AND POLITICS 41 (2006); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Aquinas and the
Extent of Moral Disagreement, in ETHICS AND POLITICS 64 (2006).
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investigation of the regulatory models underlying most U.S. government
agencies.76 Among the several models that Rabin identifies, the policing
and market-corrective models are relevant here. In Rabin's view, the
policing model "was premised on an autonomous market-controlled
economy. But adherents to this view were willing to concede that the
market systematically generated certain 'excessively competitive'
practices such as the manufacture of products that seriously endangered
health and safety or the setting of rates that were particularly
discriminatory."77  Under the policing model, administrative
bureaucracies monitor the behavior of market participants, deter
excessively competitive behavior, and thereby allow otherwise
autonomous markets to stabilize themselves. 78 By contrast, the market-
corrective model denies that markets have the capacity to stabilize
themselves even if excessively competitive behavior is deterred. 79 As a
result, the market-corrective regulatory model reflects a "commitment to
permanent market stabilization activity by the federal government." 80
Market-corrective regulation typically has included "price-fixing,
information-sharing and market-allocating schemes" ...,,81  Economic
planning is an important objective of administrative agencies under a
market-corrective scheme because, as Professor Gifford observed,
"planning and supervision of growth are logical outcomes of price and
entry regulation.,
82
Rabin's discussion of regulatory models raises an important
question: why do individuals allow, let alone require, administrative
bureaucrats to police or plan market activity? One answer, already
foreshadowed by Hobbes, is that individuals pursuing their values,
interests, and preferences fear chaos and desire order. 83  Bureaucrats
promise order.84 But this answer begs the question: why bureaucratic
order? According to MacIntyre, "the major justification advanced for the
intervention of government in society is the contention that government
has resources of competence which most citizens do not possess., 85 As
76. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 1189, 1191-94 (1986). For a more detailed summary and discussion of Rabin's
argument, see Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 377-83.
77. Rabin, supra note 76, at 1192.
78. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 377, 380.
79. See id. at 380 (quoting Rabin, supra note 76, at 1192) (internal quotations
omitted).
80. Rabin, supra note 76, at 1192.
81. Id.
82. Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and
Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REv. 299, 303 (1983).
83. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
85. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 85.
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Professor Gifford has noted, "under the conventional wisdom,
administrators were said to possess expertise developed from their
experience in regulating as well as from their ability to draw on their
staff of technicians." 86  Weber too emphasized the bureaucrat's
specialized training, experience, and expertise as well as neutrality.87
Maclntyre draws out the deep connection between the appeal to
bureaucratic competence or expertise and the emotivist underpinnings of
Weber's account of administrative bureaucracy. According to
Maclntyre, the manager's "expertise... has two sides to it: there is the
aspiration to value neutrality and the claim to manipulative power., 88
The bureaucratic expert aspires to be value neutral in that the expert
seeks to deal only with facts about the world and human behavior, not
with choices between the irrational values or value systems of the
individuals and organizations administered by the bureaucracy.8 9 The
bureaucracy claims manipulative power because its function is to create
order by compelling individuals and organizations to do that which they
might not otherwise do if they followed their own values, interests, and
preferences. 90  Indeed, under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the
bureaucracy's claim to wield manipulative power is the rational basis for
bureaucratic administration. As Maclntyre observes, "on Weber's view
no type of authority can appeal to rational criteria to vindicate itself
except that type of bureaucratic authority which appeals precisely to its
own effectiveness. And what this appeal reveals is that bureaucratic
authority is nothing other than successful power." 91 Thus, under the
post-Enlightenment paradigm, the bureaucrat is seen as a neutral expert
with superior capacity to impose order; therefore, the emotivist
individual permits and ultimately requires the bureaucracy to act as the
supervisor that polices and/or corrects the market and thereby maintains
order. 9
2
86. Gifford, supra note 82, at 306.
87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
88. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 86.
89. See id. at 84-86.
90. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
91. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 26 (emphasis in original).
92. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the merits of the appeal to
competence or expertise as a justification for allowing bureaucrats to supervise the
economy. Maclntyre has raised serious philosophical questions about whether the type
of managerial expertise claimed for the bureaucrat is even possible. MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 88-108. He refers to the belief in such expertise as the
"fetishism ... of bureaucratic skills." Id. at 107. In two classic articles, Professor Jaffe
expressed doubts about arguments for regulation based on bureaucratic expertise. See
Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954); Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1973). For discussions of the legal literature on this issue, see
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In a world consisting primarily of individuals, markets, and
bureaucracies, policy debate and disagreement tend to oscillate between
two recognizable and predictable positions.93 As Maclntyre has written,
the contending parties agree... that there are only two alternative
modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary
choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the
bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and
arbitrary choices of individuals.
94
This analysis led Maclntyre to conclude that "the society in which we
live is one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well
as antagonists." 95 We live in a "culture of bureaucratic individualism"
where there is a symbiotic relationship between the individual and the
bureaucracy. 96  Each of these elements is understood to function in
relation to the other and to the market within which each is presumed to
act. 97
In my earlier work, I showed that the U.S. and EU approaches to
Internet privacy law, although superficially quite different, in fact
represent points on the spectrum of bureaucratic individualism, with the
U.S. approach placing greater emphasis on individual freedom and the
EU approach on bureaucratic supervision.98 Taken together, however,
the two approaches
appear to define our principal options. If... the post-Enlightenment
paradigm is our normal and ordinary way of explaining and justifying
human action, then it is not surprising that the options presented by
the paradigm-individual or bureaucracy-miht appear to be the
primary, if not the only options available to us.
Internet privacy is undoubtedly one of the newest fields of law and
policy in which the post-Enlightenment paradigm has shown its
influence. This Article examines the other end of the historical
continuum. By focusing on the Supreme Court's ruminations on the ICC
Gifford, supra note 82, at 312-19 and James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the
Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 367-75 (1976). For a history of the rise
of the expert as an influential figure in the United States, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 197-229 (1963).
93. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 362.
94. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 35.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 71.
97. For a discussion of the symbiotic relationship between individual and
bureaucracy in the field of privacy law, see Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note
6, at 47-54.
98. Id. at 54-58.
99. Id. at 59.
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during the agency's first 20 years, this Article seeks to unearth some of
the roots of the process by which the two options presented by the post-
Enlightenment paradigm-individual freedom or bureaucracy-became
our primary options, and thus our way of understanding the choices
presented to us by our situation in the world. Accordingly, Part III
provides a short introduction to the ICC via a synopsis of the ICA and
then Part IV examines the emergence of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm in the Court's effort to come to grips with the ICC and its
function in our social scheme.
III. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
In 1887, four years after Nietzsche announced the death of God,
Congress adopted the ICA. 100 Congress did not frame the ICA as a
response to the succession problem in celestial government, but rather as
a solution to more mundane problems involving the U.S. government's
relationship to the growing railroad industry. 01 In the Supreme Court's
first substantial case under the ICA, the Court summarized the long-
established common law principles governing common carriers 10 2 such
as railroads. The common law
demanded little more than that they should carry for all persons who
applied, in the order in which the goods were delivered at the
particular station, and that their charges for transportation should be
reasonable. It was even doubted whether they were bound to make
the same charge to all persons for the same service; ... though the
weight of authority in this country was in favor of an equality of
charge to all persons for similar services.
10 3
In addition, as the Court recognized, "[i]n several of the States acts had
been passed with the design of securing the public against unreasonable
100. See supra note 4.
101. See infra notes 104-106.
102. A common carrier is "a carrier that is required by law to transport passengers or
freight, without refusal, if the approved fare or charge is paid." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 205 (7th ed. 1999).
103. ICC v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1892). See Texas & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 436 (1907) (summarizing common law
rules governing common carriers). Standard histories of the ICA/ICC include GABRIEL
KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); ARI & OLIVE HOOGENBOOM, A
HISTORY OF THE ICC (1976); ISAIAH L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION (1931-1937); Robert W. Harbeson, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916,
Conspiracy or Public Interest?, 27 J. ECON. HIST. 230 (1967); Albro Martin, The
Troubled Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age-A Reappraisal, 61 J. AM.
HIST. 339 (1974); Bruce Wyman, The Rise of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 24
YALE L.J. 529 (1915); and Henry C. Adams, A Decade of Federal Railway Regulation, 81
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 433 (1898).
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and unjust discriminations. ,,.104 For various reasons, however, these
laws failed to appease the hunger for regulation of railroads:
the inefficacy of these laws beyond the lines of the State, the
impossibility of securing concerted action between the legislatures
toward the regulation of traffic between the several States, and the
evils which grew up under a policy of unrestricted competition,
suggested the necessity of legislation by Congress under its
constitutional power to regulate commerce among the several
States. 1
05
In the Court's view, the "evils" that Congress sought to address
took the shape of inequality of charges made, or of facilities
furnished, and were usually dictated by or tolerated for the promotion
of the interests of the officers of the corporation or of the corporation
itself, or for the benefit of some favored persons at the expense of
others, or of some particular locality or community, or of some local
trade or commercial connection, or for the destruction or crippling of
some rival or hostile line.
10 6
How the Court or Congress knew these evils were evil (and not just very
upsetting for the injured parties), the Court does not explain.
Congress's response to these evils was the ICA, 10 7 which applied to
all railroads engaged in interstate commerce.' 0 8 The Act prohibited
"unjust discrimination," which arises if a railroad:
shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or
other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or
persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to
be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to
the provisions of this act, than it charges, demands, collects, or
receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a
104. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. at 276.
105. Id. The Court neglects to mention a point that probably would have been
obvious to anyone watching the development of railroad law in 1892, namely that the
"inefficacy" of state laws regulating railroads "beyond the lines of the state" resulted
from a decision of the Court itself under the Commerce Clause. See Wabash, St. L. & P.
Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886). Thus, the Court influenced the creation of
the ICC by blocking alternative approaches at the state level. See HOOGENBOOM, supra
note 103, at 8 (noting the significance of the Wabash case in the move toward federal
regulation of railroads); SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, supra
note 103, at 20 n.16. But cf KOLKO, supra note 103, at 33 (Congress had begun work on
railroad legislation before the Wabash case was handed down).
106. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. at 276.
107. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). For accounts of the
adoption of the ICA, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 90-93
(2001); KOLKO, supra note 103, at 30-44; and HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 8-21.
108. ICA § 1.
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like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind
of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions.... 109
Congress did not specify what the phrase "transportation... under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions" meant. The problem
of interpreting the phrase, and thus of defining the scope of the
prohibition on "unjust discrimination," was left by default to the ICC and
the courts.
In addition to banning unjust discrimination, the ICA prohibited
railroads from providing "any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or
locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect
whatsoever.... 10 Complimenting this prohibition on undue
preferences or advantages was a ban on imposing "any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. '
The use of the phrase "undue or unreasonable" to identify the types of
advantages and disadvantages that were prohibited suggests that some
advantages and disadvantages might not be undue or unreasonable. The
ICA provided no guidance, however, on how the ICC was to distinguish
the undue and unreasonable-i.e., wrongful-from the due and
reasonable-i.e., not wrongful. Decisions about which conduct was
wrongful and why were thus left by default to the ICC in the first
instance and to the courts on review.
The ICA contained two other significant prohibitions. The first,
known as the "long and short haul clause,"' 12 provided
[t]hat it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compensation
in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of
property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions,
for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same
direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but
this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within
the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a
shorter as for a longer distance.... 113
Essentially, the long and short haul clause meant that on a railroad
running from point A to point C through point B, the carrier could not
charge a fare for traffic between A and B that was equal to or higher than
109. Id. § 2.
110. Id.§3.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., ICC v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 284 (1892).
113. ICA § 4.
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the fare between A and C. Again, however, the prohibition applied only
if transportation occurred "under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions," and the ICA failed to specify what this meant.
The final significant prohibition in the ICA addressed what had
become known as pooling. 14 In the words of Professor Hall,
[t]here was fierce competition on the trunk lines (lines connecting
western agricultural regions, midwestern trade centers, and eastern
manufacturing and port cities) at the same time that extensive
monopolies existed in localities served by branch and feeder lines.
The railroads attempted to deal with these problems through pooling
arrangements, which were private agreements among carriers to serve
particular areas and to charge fixed prices.1
5
The ICA flatly prohibited this practice:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to enter into any contract, agreement, or
combination with any other common carrier or carriers for the
pooling of freights of different and competing railroads, or to divide
between them the aggregate or net proceeds of the earnings of such
railroads, or any portion thereof....
Unlike the provisions already mentioned, the prohibition on pooling
contained no phrases such as "substantially similar" or "undue and
unreasonable" that might invite litigation and, not surprisingly, very little
litigation about pooling reached the Supreme Court. 17
In addition to the provisions of the ICA prohibiting specified forms
of conduct, the ICA also contained a very early version of what has come
to be known as a "filed rate provision."'' 18 Under the ICA,
[e]very common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall file
with the Commission ... copies of its schedules of rates, fares, and
charges which have been established and published in compliance
with the requirements of this section, and shall promptly notify said
Commission of all changes made in the same.
114. Id. § 5.
115. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 205 (1989).
116. ICA § 5.
117. See, e.g., U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 315-16 (1897)
(discussing the relationship between the ICA's prohibition on pooling and the Sherman
Act's prohibition on agreements in restraint of trade).
118. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 224
(1994) (discussing the "filed rate provisions" of the Communications Act of 1934).
119. ICA § 6.
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The ICA required carriers to "print and keep for public inspection
schedules showing the rates and fares and charges for the transportation
of passengers and property .... 1,120 The ICA made it illegal for a carrier
to charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a
greater or less compensation for the transportation of passengers or
property, or for any services in connection therewith, than is specified
in such published schedule of rates, fares, and charges as may at the
time be in force.
121
Carriers were not permitted to increase listed rates, fares, and charges
"except after ten days' public notice,'' 122 although they were permitted to
reduce rates, fares, and charges by immediately posting notice and
modifying the relevant schedules. 123 The net result of these requirements
was that railroad carriers had to publish and file with the ICC all fares
and rates related to interstate traffic and the carriers had to adhere to
those fares and rates until they had given appropriate notice of the intent
to alter them. Disputes about interpretation of the filed-rate provisions
seldom reached the Supreme Court in the first two decades after the
adoption of the ICA.
124
From the standpoint of this Article, the ICA's most important
innovation was the creation of the ICC. In the words of the Act, "a
Commission is hereby created and established to be known as the Inter-
State Commerce Commission, which shall be composed of five
Commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.', 125 From a constitutional perspective,
this meant that the commissioners were treated as principal officers of
the United States. 126  The commissioners were to be appointed for
staggered six-year terms. 127 Although the President and Senate were to
participate in the appointment of ICC commissioners, the ICA included
several provisions that preserve the commissioners' independence. First,
120. Id.
121. Id. The ICA specified certain categories of tickets and ticket holders that were
exempt from the prohibition on deviating from the published rate. Thus, for example, a
railroad carrier could charge reduced rates to governments, charities, "ministers of
religion," or "officers and employees" of the company. Id. § 22.
122. Id. § 6.
123. Id.
124. For a rare example of such a dispute, see New York, New Haven & Hartford
R.R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1905).
125. ICA§ 11.
126. The Appointments Clause distinguishes between officers and inferior officers of
the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It has become customary to refer to
the former as "principal" officers. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671
(1988).
127. ICA§ 11.
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the ICA stated that "any Commissioner may be removed by the President
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
128
Approximately 50 years later, the Supreme Court held that similar
language imposed a "for cause" limitation on the President's power to
fire an agency head.1 29 Second, the ICA mandated that "[n]ot more than
three of the Commissioners shall be appointed from the same political
party.'"3  This suggests a congressional desire to avoid partisan control
of the ICC. Similarly, the provision for staggered six-year terms
signaled a desire to ensure that control of the White House would not
automatically lead to control of the ICC, since each President's
appointees to the ICC might serve deep into, or even beyond, the term of
his or her successor. Thus, the ICC was expected to act independently of
party and President.
The ICC also was expected to be independent in at least one other
respect. Under the ICA, "[n]o person in the employ of or holding any
official relation to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
act, or owning stock or bonds tfiereof, or who"is in any manner
pecuniarily interested therein, shall enter upon the duties of or hold such
office." 131 One obvious goal of such a provision was to ensure that the
ICC enjoyed a degree of independence from the industry it was
established to supervise. This provision might also have tended to
discourage people with substantial management experience in the
railroad industry from serving on the ICC, since one would expect such
people to retain a financial interest in their former employers. Thus, the
first five commissioners of the ICC appointed by President Cleveland
were former public officials, not railroad managers: Thomas M. Cooley,
a former law professor and justice of the Michigan Supreme Court;
William R. Morrison, a former congressman; Augustus Schoonmaker,
former attorney general and civil service commissioner for New York;
Aldace F. Walker, a state senator who had written the Vermont Railroad
Commission Act; and Walter Bragg, who had presided over the Alabama
railroad commission.' 32  To ensure that commissioners would enjoy
financial independence during their terms of service, the ICA set their
annual salaries at $7,500,133 which was more than federal judges (other
than members of the Supreme Court) earned in 1887.134
128. Id.
129. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935).
130. ICA§ 11.
131. Id.
132. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 19-20. For an argument that the first
Commissioners were pro-railroad in their orientation, see KOLKO, supra note 103, at 46-
49.
133. ICA § 18.
134. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 20.
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The ICC's powers under the ICA fell into two categories. First, the
ICC could receive complaints and adjudicate cases concerning alleged
violations of the ICA brought by interested parties or the ICC itself.'35
After a hearing and a finding that a rail carrier had violated the ICA, the
ICC was required to issue a "notice" or "order"'136 directing the carrier to
(1) cease and desist from violating the ICA and/or (2) make appropriate
reparations to any injured parties. 37  The ICC also was required to
petition the federal courts in the event that a rail carrier decided to
"violate or refuse or neglect to obey any lawful order or requirement of
the Commission .... ,138 If after an appropriate hearing the court found
that a "lawful order or requirement of said Commission drawn in
question has been violated or disobeyed,"'139 the court could use its equity
power to enforce the ICC's order. 40  It is worth noting that the ICA
repeatedly refers to judicial enforcement of a "lawful order or
requirement," thus empowering the courts to determine which ICC
orders were lawful and which were not.'
4
'
The ICC's second major area of power and responsibility under the
ICA might be termed general oversight of the rail industry:
the Commission... shall have authority to inquire into the
management of the business of all common carriers subject to the
provisions of this act, and shall keep itself informed as to the manner
and method in which the same is conducted, and shall have the right
to obtain from such common carriers full and complete information
necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry
out the objects for which it was created.... 142
The ICC's authority to obtain "full and complete information" included
the power-with the "aid of any court of the United States"-to require
testimony by individuals and production of documents. "43
Supplementing the ICC's general authority to inquire into the activities
135. See ICA § 13 (establishing right to petition commission regarding violations of
ICA and imposing duty on ICC to investigate complaints); id. § 14 (requiring ICC to
issue written reports on investigations and make recommendations to carriers concerning
"reparations" to injured parties).
136. Section 15 of the ICA requires the ICC to send a cease-and-desist "notice," but
section 16 gives the ICC authority to appeal to the federal courts to enforce "any lawful
order or requirement," a phrase that apparently covers a notice issued under section 15.
The Supreme Court typically used the term "order" to refer to an ICC cease-and-desist
notice. See, e.g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 162 U.S. 184, 186 (1896).
137. ICA§ 15.
138. Id. § 16.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See S. Pac. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 536, 551 (1906).
142. ICA § 12.
143. Id.
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of rail carriers, the ICA empowered the ICC "to require annual reports
from all common carriers subject to the provisions of [the ICA] ... and
to require from such carriers specific answers to all questions upon
which the Commission may need information."1 44  The ICA also
authorized the ICC to require that carriers adopt "as near as may be, a
uniform system of accounts, and the manner in which such accounts shall
be kept.' 45  Thus, the ICA subjected interstate rail carriers to
unprecedented federal administrative oversight and anticipated that
carriers might be required to change their internal practices, i.e., their
bookkeeping, to facilitate such oversight.
The ICA gave the ICC one additional responsibility-preparation of
an annual report to Congress. 46  The ICA provided little guidance
concerning the content of the annual report: the ICC was expected to
provide "such information and data collected ... as may be considered of
value in the determination of questions connected with the regulation of
commerce, together with such recommendations as to additional
legislation relating thereto as the Commission may deem necessary."
147
Based on this provision, it appears that Congress expected the ICC to
become increasingly well-informed about the field of interstate
commerce and to assume the role of advisor to Congress regarding
commerce regulation. Thus, over time, the ICC would help to set the
policies that it then would be tasked with administering, policies based
on information about the rail industry that the ICC itself had gathered.
Congress revised the ICA and/or modified the ICC's authority
several times during the first two decades of the agency's existence,
148
and one of those modifications nicely illustrates the role of the ICC in the
policymaking cycle. The 1893 Safety Appliance Act149 ("SAA")
essentially gave rail carriers five years to install power braking
equipment on locomotives and automatic coupling equipment on all rail
144. Id. § 20.
145. Id.
146. ICA § 21. The ICA actually required the ICC to "make a report to the Secretary
of the Interior." Id. The Secretary then had the duty to transmit the report to Congress.
There is nothing in the ICA to suggest that the Secretary was to have any role in
preparing the report or otherwise overseeing the substantive activities of the ICC. Cf id.
§ 18 (giving the Secretary a role in setting the compensation of ICC employees,
establishing offices for the ICC, and handling expense vouchers for commissioners and
ICC employees).
147. Id.§21.
148. See, e.g., Act of August 7, 1888, ch. 772, 25 Stat. 382 (1888); Act of March 2,
1889, ch. 382, 25 Stat. 855 (1889); Act of Feb. 10, 1891, ch. 128, 26 Stat. 743 (1891);
Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903); Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
149. Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893).
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cars.' 50  Congress took these steps in significant part because of a
campaign orchestrated by the ICC, which organized a conference as
early as 1889 to focus attention on rail safety.' 5' As the Supreme Court
noted, President Harrison actively participated in the debate about rail
safety, calling on Congress during his State of the Union messages in
1889, 1890, and 1891 to adopt legislation on braking and coupling.1
52
And he reiterated his recommendation in succeeding messages,
saying in that for 1892: "Statistics furnished by the Interstate
Commerce Commission show that during the year ending June 30,
1891, there were forty-seven different styles of car couplers reported
to be in use, and that during the same period there was 2,660
employees killed and 26,140 injured. Nearly 16 per cent of the
deaths occurred in the coupling and uncoupling of cars, and over 36
per cent of the injuries had the same origin."15
When Congress adopted the SAA in 1893, it mandated changes in
braking and coupling technologies and expanded the authority of the ICC
in the field of railroad safety. 15 4 Thus, by pressing Congress to make
railways safer, the ICC helped to trigger Congressional action that
resulted in an expansion of ICC power.
Discussing the ICC's role in the adoption of the SAA, Ari and Olive
Hoogenboom criticized the ICC because "it passively and typically-as
ensuing years would show-decided that it was 'not prepared to
recommend a national law prescribing appliances,' but submitted the
whole question to 'the wisdom of Congress.' The ICC... wanted
Congress to act but would not tell it what to enact."'' 55  The
Hoogenbooms failed to give the ICC sufficient credit, perhaps because
they saw in the ICC's early actions on rail safety a harbinger of future
failings, 156 rather than an honest effort to act responsibly under
unprecedented conditions. Here a brand new, sui generis federal agency
began almost immediately after its creation to extend the scope of its
150. Id. § 1 (mandating power braking equipment), § 2 (mandating automatic
couplers).
151. HOOGENBOOM,supra note 103, at 33.
152. Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 19 (1904).
153. Id. at 19-20.
154. See ch. 196, 27 Stat. at 531. The SAA (1) gave the ICC a significant role in
setting standards that "drawbars," an element of braking technology, would have to meet
in order to comply with federal law; (2) imposed on the ICC a duty to alert district
attorneys to violations of the SAA; and (3) authorized the ICC to extend the deadline for
compliance with the SAA. Id. §§ 5, 6 & 7.
155. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 33-34.
156. The opening line of the Hoogenbooms' history reads: "Nearly everyone agrees
that the Interstate Commerce Commission has failed." Id. at ix. Thus, the history that
they recount is one of failure and early ICC actions are interpreted as foreshadowing
failures to come.
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policymaking authority by initiating an investigation into rail safety and
feeding significant new information to the White House and Congress for
use in the policy debate. As a result, the agency apparently got what it
wanted, i.e., legislation on rail safety, while obtaining new authority over
the industry it was tasked to regulate. If this was passivity, it was
passivity of a productive sort. 157 The ICC also played an important role
in the lobbying process that led to the adoption of the 1906 Hepburn
Act, 158 which gave the ICC new authority to set maximum reasonable
rates for rail freight in certain circumstances.
159
IV. THE ICC AND THE POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM
This Part of the Article shows that the Supreme Court, in reviewing
the ICC's implementation of the ICA during the period from 1887 to
roughly 1910, began to articulate the elements of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm and incorporated those elements into the framework of the
ICA. Specifically, the Court treated the people and entities regulated by
the ICA as individuals pursuing their interests in competitive markets or
in one large competitive market. 160  The ICC emerged in the Court's
writings as the neutral, expert administrative agency tasked initially with
policing unreasonable rates in the market and then later with correcting
the market by setting reasonable rates. 161 The Court never suggested,
however, that the ICC had a special insight into the nature of reasonable
(or unreasonable) conduct by railroads or anyone else. On the contrary,
the Court appeared to acknowledge that a railroad's conduct would be
deemed reasonable or not simply because the ICC, or the ICC and the
Court, said it was. 162 There is, in other words, no objective standard of
reasonableness to apply. In Nietzsche's nihilistic phrase, all is
permitted-except that which the ICC prohibits. Thus, an ICC-imposed
order provided the bulwark against potential chaos while a fiction was
maintained that the ICC operated under a standard of reasonableness in
an era when there were no rationally persuasive standards.
157. For more documentation of the ICC's role in pushing for adoption of safety
legislation, see SHARFMAN, 1 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, supra note 103, at
246 n.4.
158. For the ICC's role in passing the Hepburn Act, see HOOGENBOOM, supra note
103, at 46-52 and SHARFMAN, 1 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, supra note 103, at
40 n.39 (indicating that the ICC proposed legislation for Congress to consider).
159. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's response to the Hepburn Act, see infra notes 307-308, 311-330 and
accompanying text.
160. See infra Part IV.A.
161. See infra Part IV.B.
162. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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A. Individuals & Markets
This Part of the Article begins with a brief summary of the historical
background to the period in which the ICC was established. It focuses
on the relative novelty of the notion of the individual, which MacIntyre
has described as a "cultural artifact of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries,"' 63 and the origins of the notion of the market economy. Next,
there is a discussion of how the Supreme Court took up, used, and
endorsed ideas about the individual and the market in attempting to
explain, delimit, and justify the role of the ICC. The very recent origins
of the individual and the market disappear from view in the Court's
opinions, which thus rupture the link with a more traditional past while
lending the new post-Enlightenment paradigm a misleading aura of
timelessness and inevitability.
164
1. The Historical Background-Roots of the 19 th Century in a
Different Form of Life
Demonstrating that the Supreme Court tended to regard the
participants in the economic life of railroads as individuals trading in
markets may seem like a bizarre enterprise. What else were the
participants if not individuals? Is it not obvious that we are all
individuals and that we all trade in markets? Should we not expect the
Court to reflect this obvious "insight" in its writings about the ICA and
the ICC? In order to address these questions, it is useful to examine
briefly a different, more traditional way of understanding who and what
we are. As discussed in Part II, the older, teleological account of human
nature and moral life held that we are essentially social beings expressing
our moral lives in and through our social roles. 165 Thus, for example, as
a law professor I am a teacher of students, an academic colleague, a
member of the scholarly community, and an employee of my university.
Moreover, within my family, I am a son, brother, and uncle, while within
my community I am a householder and neighbor. Each of these aspects
of who I am is partially defined by certain precepts about virtues and
vices, precepts about the type of conduct that is proper or improper for a
person who is a professor, uncle, neighbor and so forth. Such precepts
are implicit in the judgments that we make every day when we say that a
person is a good colleague or a bad neighbor, a great teacher or a
mediocre scholar. It is important to notice that all of the roles I have
mentioned are relational. I am a teacher in relation to students. I am a
163. MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS, supra note 13, at 190.
164. See infra notes 264-266 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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scholar in relation to academic colleagues at my school and elsewhere. I
am a son in relation to my mother and deceased father. According to the
old teleological paradigm, in each of these relationships, I am what I am
(teacher, scholar, son, etc.) as a member of a pair or a group.1 66 When I
interact with other members of a pair or a group of which I am a
member, I view them not as individuals with whom I trade in a market
while pursuing my individual interests and preferences, but as fellow
participants in a joint effort to achieve shared goods and a "shared vision
of the good life' ' 167 that we might capture in a phrase such as a well-
respected law school, a happy family, or a good neighborhood.
This account of the person as a member of a social nexus inhabiting
various social positions contrasts markedly with the self-understanding
of the modern individual in a market society. The modern individual
sees himself or herself as free of any essential roles or relationships and
free of any traditional account of the human good or end that might
trump his or her private interests. 168  According to Maclntyre, "in
acquiring sovereignty in its own realm[, the modem self] lost its
traditional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human
life as ordered to a given end."'169 This "self which has no necessary
social content and no necessary social identity can then be anything, can
assume any role or take any point of view, because it is in and for itself
nothing."'170 As Maclntyre said in another context, this is a self "whose
distinctive identity consists in key part in the ability to escape social
identification, by always being able to abstract him or herself from any
role whatsoever; it is the individual who is potentially many things, but
actually in and for him or herself nothing."'' The market is, as it were,
the natural habitat for this individual who is nothing in himself or herself,
but who chooses roles and interests, and then having so chosen, sets out
to obtain or achieve what he or she wants by trading with other
individuals. 172 Thus, while my relations with other people in groups and
communities define who and what I am under the older, teleological
paradigm, my relationships with others as an individual are simply
166. Hegel, a relatively late representative of this tradition, argued that the family
bond is based on love and that because one's family is essential to who one is, "one is in
it not as an independent person but as a member." GEORG WILHELM FRJEDRICH HEGEL,
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 110 (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford University Press 1967)
(1821). For a much older account of the family in which participants are treated as
members, not individuals, see ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 18-29 (Ernest Barker trans.,
Clarendon Press 1952).
167. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
168. Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 360-361.
169. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 34.
170. Id. at 32.
171. MACINTYRE, Practical Rationalities, supra note 48, at 135.
172. Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 360-361.
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contractual or consensual means to attaining my individual ends in the
post-Enlightenment framework.
As stated thus far, this contrast between two different accounts of
our natures and lives as human beings-the traditional teleological
account and the account that predominates under the post-Enlightenment
paradigm-is entirely theoretical. It has, however, important "real
world" analogues in our recent history that help to clarify why the ICC's
tendency to focus on the individual trading in the market is important.
As economist and philosopher Karl Polanyi showed in his work The
Great Transformation, something like the traditional, teleological
account of human nature and moral life predominated at most times and
places throughout human history until recently. Summarizing the
evidence, Polanyi wrote:
[t]he outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological
research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social
relationship. He does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest
in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his
social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values
material goods only in so far as they serve this end. Neither the
process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific
economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every
single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests
which eventually ensure that the required step be taken. These
interests will be very different in a small hunting or fishing
community from those in a vast despotic society, but in either case
the economic system will be run on noneconomic motives.
1 73
Contrary to Adam Smith's "paradigm of the bartering savage," 174 Polanyi
contends that
[t]he individualistic savage collecting food and hunting on his own or
for his family has never existed. Indeed, the practice of catering for
the needs of one's household becomes a feature of economic life only
on a more advanced level of agriculture; however, even then it has
nothing in common either with the motive of gain or with the
institution of markets. Its pattern is the closed group. Whether the
very different entities of the family or the settlement or the manner
formed the self-sufficient unit, the principle was invariably the same,
173. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 46 (1944). For summaries of the
same point by anthropologists, see GODFREY LIENHARDT, SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 85-86
(2d ed. 1966) and MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 185-191 (1972).
174. POLANYI, supra note 173, at 44.
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namely, that of producing and storing for the satisfaction of the wants
of the members of the group.
175
Thus, throughout most of human history, the person lived his or her life
and saw himself or herself not as an individual pursuing individual
interests and preferences in a market with others, but as a member of an
ongoing social group playing various roles within the group for the
ultimate benefit of the group.
What Polanyi refers to as the "great transformation," i.e., the
emergence of the market and with it the modem individual from
traditional communal life, 176 occurred in roughly a century beginning in
1776, a date that is important not because of the American Revolution
but because it marks the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations.177  According to Polanyi, Smith's analysis placed heavy
emphasis on
man's 'propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for
another.' This phrase was later to yield the concept of the Economic
Man. In retrospect it can be said that no misreading of the past ever
proved more prophetic of the future. For while up to Adam Smith's
time that propensity had hardly shown up on a considerable scale in
the life of any observed community, and had remained, at best, a
subordinate feature of economic life, a hundred years later an
industrial system was in full swing over the major part of the planet
which, practically and theoretically, implied that the human race was
swayed in all its economic activities, if not also in its political,
intellectual, and spiritual pursuits, by that one particular
propensity.
178
Taking Polanyi's timeline literally, one hundred years after the
publication of Smith's magnum opus, we find ourselves in 1876, just
under ten years before the adoption of the ICA and the establishment of
the ICC. Only if we recognize that the ICC enters history near the end of
a process of radical social transformation leading to the emergence of the
modem individual trading in the market, can we appreciate the full
significance of the assumption that the world the ICC administers
consists primarily of individuals pursuing their interests in a market.
175. Id. at 53.
176. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 239.
177. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
178. POLANYI, supra note 173, at 43-44.
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Polanyi's work focused primarily on the development of a market
economy in Europe, particularly in England,1 79 and he went so far as to
suggest that the market economy in the United States may have emerged
with the adoption of the U.S. Constitution.180  Richard Hofstadter
provided a more nuanced account of the development of the market in
the United States, discussing the persistence of what he called the
"agrarian myth" of the yeoman farmer in American political life.' 81 The
agrarian myth emphasized the "noncommercial, nonpecuniary, self-
sufficient aspect of American farm life. 182  In Hofstadter's view,
however,
[b]etween 1815 and 1860 the character of American agriculture was
transformed. The independent yeoman, outside of exceptional or
isolated areas, almost disappeared before the relentless advance of
commercial agriculture. The rise of native industry created a home
market for agriculture, while at the same time demands arose abroad,
at first for American cotton and then for American foodstuffs. A
network of turnpikes, canals, and railroads linked the planter and the
advancing Western farmer to these new markets, while the Eastern
farmer, spurred by Western competition, began to cultivate more
thoroughly the nearby urban outlets for his products.183
According to Hofstadter, this gradual shift from the self-sufficient,
locally oriented yeoman farmer of the agrarian myth to the market-
oriented commercial farmer occurred at different speeds in different parts
of the country, but "in so far as this process was unfinished in 1860, the
demands of the Civil War brought it to completion."'' 84 In this respect,
then, Hofstadter's timeline is similar to Polanyi's. In the hundred years
before 1876, agrarian life had evolved from something like an integrated,
self-sufficient community that Aristotle might have recognized into a
marketplace in which individuals pursued their preferences and interests
in the style of Adam Smith's Economic Man. 185  As already noted,
179. See, e.g., id. at 30 (commenting on the development of "market society" in
England, Germany, Italy, and Austria).
180. Id. at 225-226. For further comments by Polanyi on developments in the United
States, see for example, id. at 217, 234, 249.
181. RicHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 24 (1955). Hofstadter noted that
"[b]y 'myth,' ... I do not mean an idea that is simply false, but rather one that so
effectively embodies men's values that it profoundly influences their way of perceiving
reality and hence their behavior. In this sense myths may have varying degrees of fiction
or reality." Id. at 24 n. 1.
182. Id. at 23.
183. Id. at 38.
184. Id. at 39.
185. Morton Horwitz has provided a very interesting description of some of the legal
changes that both reflected and facilitated this transformation. See MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 31-140, 160-253 (1977).
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Congress created the ICC in 1887 at the end of this transformation to
oversee the operation of interstate railroads, the lynchpin of the
transportation system without which a national and international market
for farm crops and other products could not have arisen.
1 86
2. Individuals in the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the ICA
The word "individual" does not appear in the ICA. The stars among
the ICA's dramatis personae are common carriers and "persons" who
pay common carriers for services rendered,1 87 receive potentially
unlawful preferences or advantages, 188 and suffer injuries when common
carriers misbehave.1 89 "Persons" also may complain to the ICC about
their treatment by carriers.' 90 Other characters with smaller roles in the
ICA include firms, corporations, and associations, as well as "mercantile,
agricultural, or manufacturing societ[ies],'' and "any body politic or
municipal organization,"' 192 all of whom also may complain to the ICC
about "anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act in contravention of the provisions
thereof... The final ICA character that should be noted is the
"passenger." Passengers are mentioned frequently in the Act, but
typically in the phrase "passengers or [or "and"] property" 194 or
"passengers and freight."'' 95  Thus, although a passenger clearly is a
person, the ICA effectively treats passengers as equivalent to property or
freight, i.e., as items to be shipped from Point A to Point B. Although
the ICA does not identify shippers, railroad companies, or passengers as
individuals in the sense described in Part IV.A.1, the Supreme Court
tended to treat them as individuals bound to a market. With little or no
argument, the Court thus provided legal recognition at the highest level
for the results of Polanyi's "great transformation" and introduced two
key elements of the post-Enlightenment paradigm into the interpretation
of the ICA.
Evidence that the Supreme Court viewed persons regulated by the
ICA as individuals appeared in one of the first major ICC cases to reach
the Court. In the 1892 Baltimore & Ohio case 196 the Pittsburgh,
186. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
187. ICA, ch. 104, §§ 2, 6, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887).
188. Id.§3.
189. Id. § 8.
190. Id. § 9.
191. Id. § 13.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. §§ 1, 2,3,4,6.
195. Id. § 6.
196. ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263 (1892).
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Cincinnati & St. Louis Railway Company had challenged the Baltimore
& Ohio's practice of selling "party rate" tickets under which a group of
ten or more people traveling together on a single ticket paid a fare of two
cents per mile rather than the usual fare of three cents per mile for a
single-person ticket. 197 The ICC declared that such party tickets violated
the ICA as a form of "unjust discrimination.' 198 The Court disagreed.
The Court relied on an analogy between discriminatory passenger fares
and discriminatory rates for freight, an analogy that revealed the Court's
fundamental assumptions about the world that the ICA regulated.
If. . . a railway makes to the public generally a certain rate of freight,
and to a particular individual residing in the same town a reduced rate
for the same class of goods, this may operate as an undue preference,
since it enables the favored party to sell his goods at a lower price
than his competitors, and may even enable him to obtain a complete
monopoly of that business. Even if the same reduced rate be allowed
to every one doing the same amount of business, such discrimination
may, if carried too far, operate 4njustly upon the smaller dealers
engaged in the same business, and enable the larger ones to drive
them out of the market. 1
99
The Court constructed this analogy around two basic elements: (1) the
individual who pursues his or her own interests at the expense of other
individuals and (2) the market within which individuals trade. Against
this backdrop, the Court interpreted the ICA as limiting individual
pursuit of individual preferences in the freight market. Because the
Baltimore & Ohio case itself involved passenger fares rather than freight
rates, the Court admitted that its reflections on the behavior of
individuals trading in the freight market were based not on the facts of
the case, but on what it took to be "an established principle of the
business. 2 °°  The Court thereby disclosed its assumption that "the
business". revolved around two elements of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, i.e., the individual pursuing personal preferences and the
market. By disclosing this paradigmatic assumption, the Court implicitly
endorsed the view that the individual and the market are central to the
interpretation of the ICA.
For reasons that also appear to reflect the significance of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
ICA, the Court was willing to permit greater discrimination among fares
197. Id. at 264.
198. Id. at 265.
199. Id. at 280.
200. Id.
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in the passenger market than among rates for freight. A lower fare for a
group ticket
does not operate to the prejudice of the single passenger, who cannot
be said to be injured by the fact that another is able in a particular
instance to travel at a less rate than he.... [It] was not the design of
the [ICA] to stifle competition, nor is there any legal injustice in one
person procuring a particular service cheaper than another.
20 1
The Court's reasoning on this point is not particularly lucid. The Court
seems to be suggesting that under the ICA, Shipper A has a right to ship
her apples at the same rate that Shipper B pays to ship his apples over the
same line to the same destination. But Passenger A does not have a right
to ship herself at the same fare that Passenger B pays to ship himself.
This may be because apples are fungible commodities with a market
price that is affected by discriminatory shipping costs, which therefore
are prohibited by the ICA's ban on unjust discrimination. By contrast,
each person is assumed to be an individual, not a fungible commodity.
Because each individual is unique, charging different fares over the same
line to the same destination for Individual A and Individual B does not
entail treating like things differently, but rather treating different things,
i.e., different individuals, differently. Treating different, non-fungible
things differently is not unjust or discriminatory. Thus, as one would
expect under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the passenger enters the
market for railroad services as an individual, trades as an individual, and
may be subjected to individualized treatment by railroads, even though
nothing in the ICA required the Court or the ICC to treat the passenger as
an individual.
As the Court's language in the Baltimore & Ohio case suggests, in
the early years after the establishment of the ICC, the Court tended to
treat shippers, i.e., people or companies who used rail services to move
goods, as individuals. Thus, the Court stated in 1897 that the ICC
is charged with the duty of seeing that there is no violation of the
long and short haul clause; that there is no discrimination between
individual shippers, and that nothing is done, by rebate or any other
device, to give preference to one as against another; that no undue
preferences are 2iven to one place or places or individual or class of
individuals ....
The Court shifted without comment from writing about "individual
shippers" to writing about shippers as individuals. A similar shift
201. Id.at280-81.
202. ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 506 (1897).
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occurred in a 1906 case concerning the ICA's requirement that railroads
publish and adhere to shipping rates. The Court wrote:
Without a statutory requirement as to publication of rates and the
imposition of a duty to adhere to the rates as published, individual
action of the shippers, as between themselves and in their dealings
with the carrier, would have full play, and thereby every shipper
would have the opportunity to procure such concessions as might
result from favoritism or other causes. Interpreting the prohibitions
of the statute as it is contended they should be, it would follow that
every individual would be bound by the 3published tariff, and the
carrier alone would be free to disregard it.2
0
Here again is the shift from "individual action" by shippers to shippers as
individuals. We also see the paradigmatic presumption that individuals
trade with one another in the market in order to achieve their individual
interests without regard to the interests of third parties. Similarly, in
1907, the Court wrote of "discrimination as against an individual, or a
discrimination or preference in favor of or against an individual or a
specific commodity or commodities or localities," and then a few
sentences later made it clear that the "individuals" it had in mind were
"manufacturers and shippers., 20 4 Again, the Court's off-hand references
to individuals and markets reflected the post-Enlightenment paradigm
and implicitly gave it the Court's imprimatur by weaving the market-
oriented individual who pursues personal interests into the fabric of the
ICA.
A somewhat less obvious but equally important indication of the
role of the individual in the Supreme Court's thinking about shippers and
users of rail services may be the repeated invocation of the notion that
the ICA grants shippers "equal rights." For example, in 1897, the Court
wrote that the ICA's ban on discrimination (§ 2) "was designed to
compel every carrier to give equal rights to all shippers over its own
road... 20  In the same year, the Court announced that the ICC's
responsibility was to ensure "in all things that equality of right, which is
the great purpose of the interstate commerce act, shall be secured to all
shippers. 20 6 Again, in 1897 the Court stated "the purpose of the second
section [of the ICA] is to enforce equality between shippers over the
same line.... ,207 Writing in 1906, the Court stated that "the great
purpose of the act to regulate commerce, whilst seeking to prevent unjust
203. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 395 (1906).
204. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Ry. Co. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 142, 157 (1907).
205. Wight v. U.S., 167 U.S. 512, 517 (1897).
206. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P Ry. Co., 167 U.S. at 506-07.
207. ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 166 (1897).
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and unreasonable rates, was to secure equality of rates as to all, and to
destroy favoritism.... ,208 In 1908, the Court referred to "the central and
controlling purpose of the law, which is to require all shippers to be
treated alike, and but one rate to be charged for similar carriage of
freight... ,209 1 believe this drumbeat of references to equal rights and
equal treatment is another reflection of the central role of the individual
in the post-Enlightenment paradigm. The equality of all individuals was
an element of the Enlightenment creed articulated by John Locke,21°
among others. 211 Discussing liberal political theory that traces its roots to
Locke, MacIntyre wrote "any inequality in the treatment of individuals
qua individuals requires justification. Justice is prima facie
egalitarian. ''212 From the major premise that all shippers are individuals
and the minor premise that all individuals are or should be equal, it is a
short syllogistic step to the conclusion that all shippers should be treated
equally. In this respect, the rhetoric of equal treatment for shippers and
other users of rail services in the Court's early ICC cases flowed from
the same Enlightenment sources that led to the individualism of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm.213
Even if one concedes that there is an important strand of
individualist rhetoric in the early ICC cases, the suggestion that the
Supreme Court implicitly adopted the post-Enlightenment paradigm of
individuals trading in markets seems to run afoul of another important
line of argument in these same cases. I refer to the passages in which the
Court contrasts individuals and corporations. For example, the Court
208. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 200 U.S. at 391.
209. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 80 (1908). For another
invocation of this principle of equality or equal treatment, see Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 (1907).
210. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 250 (identifying Locke as an
important ancestor of modem individualist moral theories).
211. The radical egalitarianism of Enlightenment thought becomes apparent in
Professor Lovejoy's summary:
in nearly all the provinces of thought in the Enlightenment the ruling
assumption was that Reason... is the same in all men and equally possessed
by all; that this common reason should be the guide of life; and therefore that
universal and equal intelligibility, universal acceptability, and even universal
familiarity, to all normal members of the human species, regardless of
differences of time, place, race, and individual propensities and endowments,
constitute the decisive criterion of validity or of worth in all matters of vital
human concernment....
LOVEJOY, supra note 22, at 288-89. Perhaps the most famous statement of
Enlightenment egalitarianism occurs in the opening phrases of the Declaration of
Independence: "[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal .. " THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
212. See MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 344.
213. For a discussion of the origins of post-Enlightenment individualism, see supra
notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
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wrote "[t]he presumption of honest intent and right conduct attends the
action of carriers as well as it does the action of other corporations or
individuals in their transactions in life. ' 14 In a later case, the Court
observed that "the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to
those of corporations no less than to those of individuals. .. The
Court's distinction between individual and corporation is important
because, as the Court noted in 1909, "the great majority of business
transactions in modem times are conducted through these bodies [i.e.,
corporations], and.., interstate commerce is almost entirely in their
hands.... ,,216 In particular, as the Court recognized, "[i]t may be
doubted whether there are any individual carriers engaged in interstate
commerce, 217 as opposed to carriers "of a corporate character., 21 8 If all
railroad companies were corporations, then it follows that transactions in
the market between passengers or shippers and railroad companies were
transactions between an individual, and something that was not an
individual. To the extent that the Court recognized the existence and
significance in the market of an entity that was not an individual, the
Court appeared to be relying on a framework that was different from the
post-Enlightenment paradigm.
A thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of
corporations in the 19 th and early 2 0 th centuries is beyond the scope of
this Article.219 It is worth noting, however, that the Court seemed to be
of at least two minds about the best way to understand railroad
corporations. First, the Court sometimes treated such corporations as the
tools or instruments of individuals in the market. In 1899, the Court
upheld against a Commerce Clause challenge an Ohio law requiring all
railroad companies operating in the state to stop at least three times per
day (excluding Sundays) in any town of 3,000 or more inhabitants
through which the railroad company ran at least three trains per day.22°
According to the Court, "[a]ny other view of the relations between the
state and the corporation created by it would mean that the directors of
the corporation could manage its affairs solely with reference to the
interests of the stockholders, and without taking into consideration the
214. ICC v. Chicago, Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108, 119 (1908).
215. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 496-97.
218. Id. at 496.
219. For brief accounts of the history of corporate law during the relevant period, see
ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
HiSTORY 11-17, 119-40 (1967); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
511-25 (2d. ed. 1985); and HALL, supra note 115, at 96-99 (discussing antebellum
corporate law), 197-99 (discussing state regulation of railroads and other corporations).
220. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285 (1899).
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interests of the general public. ' 221 Clearly the Court believed that in the
absence of legislation to the contrary, directors (who were individuals)
would likely manage corporations to achieve the interests of stockholders
(who we may presume were individuals or corporations run by
individuals). In other words, absent regulation, a corporation is no more
than a means to the ends of interested individuals operating in the
market, a view of the corporate form that is entirely consistent with the
post-Enlightenment paradigm.
Viewed as a means, the corporate form may give one set of
individuals significant power in the market when dealing with other
individuals. As the Supreme Court observed in 1873,
[t]he carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of equality.
The latter is only one individual of a million. He cannot afford to
higgle or stand out and seek redress in the courts. His business will
not admit such a course. He prefers, rather, to accept any bill of
lading, 'or sign any paper the carrier presents; often, indeed, without
knowing what the one or the other contains. In most cases, he has no
alternative but to do this, or abandon his business.
2
In an 1897 case, the Court remarked that "as to a majority of those living
along its line, each railroad is a monopoly. 223  In light of these
comments, it is clear that the railroad corporation was not only a means
but a powerful means to achieve the ends of its owners. And it would
not be surprising if individuals chose to use the corporate form to achieve
their market interests precisely because of the significant market power
associated with incorporation. As Polanyi recognized, in a market
system, individuals who seekto achieve individual interests will try to
control the market by adopting a corporate form. 4 By emphasizing the
disproportionate power that incorporation may give to individuals in the
railroad market, the Court provided further indirect evidence that the
post-Enlightenment paradigm helped to shape its understanding of the
world in which the ICC operated.
In addition to treating the corporation as a means to the individual's
ends, the Supreme Court sometimes seemed disposed to treat
corporations as tantamount to individuals, thereby placing corporations
directly into one of the post-Enlightenment paradigm's basic categories.
Given the rapid growth in the number of railroad corporations in the
second quarter of the nineteenth century,225 and the "great boom in
221. Id. at 302.
222. N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 379 (1873).
223. U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 335 (1897).
224. See POLANYI, supra note 173, at 148.
225. See HORWITZ, supra note 185, at 137.
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railroads during the two decades before the Civil War, 22 6 it is not
surprising that the Court announced this view of corporation-as-
individual in an early railroad case. As the Court said, "for acts done by
the agents of a corporation, either in contractu or in delicto, in the course
of its business, and of their employment, the corporation is responsible,
as an individual is responsible under similar circumstances. 227  Over
fifty years later, the Court extended this analogy, holding that railroad
corporations may be made criminally liable for their agents' violations of
the ICA as amended by the Elkins Act. 228 As the Court observed,
[i]t is a part of the public history of the times that statutes against
rebates could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals only
were subject to punishment for violation of the law, when the giving
of rebates or concessions inured to the benefit of the corporations of
which the individuals were but the instruments.
229
Thus, the decision to impose criminal liability on corporations as
principals for the acts of their agents was in effect a decision to treat
corporations as tantamount to individuals. Viewed as individuals,
railroads and other business corporations fit squarely into the post-
Enlightenment paradigm.
Assuming I am correct that the Supreme Court read the notion of
the individual into the ICA,230 and treated the corporation as an
instrument of the individual or as an individual in itself, it is useful at this
point to note some important implications of the Court's approach. The
individual, whether it be a shipper, a passenger, or a railroad, plays a
very specific role in the Court's analyses. The individual functions as a
bearer of interests. For example, the individual's interests might involve
growing and storing wheat for shipment to specified destinations within a
particular timeframe at a particular price. As discussed in the next Part,
the individual will pursue those interests in a market by interacting with
other individuals. Depending on the prices and services available in the
market, the individual might store the wheat longer, ship more or less of
it, or ship it to different destinations and at different times. The interests
themselves-e.g., growing wheat, storing wheat, shipping wheat,
carrying wheat by rail, receiving wheat, consuming wheat-are surds.
226. See id. at 69.
227. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210
(1858).
228. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909).
229. Id. at 495.
230. 1 do not wish to take a position in this Article on whether the Supreme Court's
reading of the ICA did or did not accurately capture the intent of Congress. Rather, my
goal is simply to examine the emergence of the post-Enlightenment paradigm in the
Court's interpretation of the ICA and the ICA's relationship to our social scheme.
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They are givens lying solely within the purview of the sovereign
individual who simply has those particular interests and not others.23 1
The individual's interests reflect the individual's preferences and values,
and those lie beyond rational debate, as does the degree of the
individual's commitment to pursuing particular interests or preferences at
the expense of others. Because the individual is a bearer of interests,
values, and preferences, and because interests, values, and preferences lie
beyond rational debate, any system founded upon the individual must
contend with the difficulties arising from such a non-rational foundation.
As discussed in Part 1I, for the individual whose conduct is not subject to
rational, objective standards, Nietzsche concluded that all is permitted.
This suggests that in reading the individual into the ICA, the Supreme
Court read the problem of nihilism into the ICC's post-Enlightenment
agenda.
3. Markets in the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the ICA
As discussed in Part II, under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the
market is the arena in which individuals interact and pursue their self-
defined interests and preferences. This is true whether the individuals
are natural persons or corporations. In cases dealing with the ICA, the
Supreme Court occasionally mentioned "markets" or "the market,"
sometimes referring to the competitive environment for railroad services
and other times referring to competition among shippers who used
railroad services. 2  However, the Court's occasional use of these terms
did not begin to exhaust the role of the market as an analytical tool in the
Court's thinking about the ICA. In the 1892 Baltimore & Ohio case, the
Court offered a glimpse of its background assumptions about the world
that the ICA governs. According to the Court, the ICA
was not designed ... to prevent competition between different roads,
or to interfere with the customary arrangements made by railway
companies for reduced fares in consideration of increased mileage,
where such reduction did not operate as an unjust discrimination
231. See Kightlinger, Gathering Twilight, supra note 6, at 368 (discussing the
criterionless character of individual values and interests).
232. See, e.g., ICC v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 280 (1892) (rate
discrimination by railroads may allow some dealers to drive others out of the market);
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U.S. 648, 662 (1900) (Memphis is one of many
markets with which Charleston does business); New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.
Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 392-93 (1905) (carrier that also deals in products carried could
control and monopolize shipments to a particular market); ICC v. Chicago, Great W. Ry.
Co., 209 U.S. 108, 121 (1908) (whether rate materially affects markets is factor in
determining whether railroad granted an undue or unreasonable preference); S. Ry. Co. v.
St. Louis Hay & Grain Co., 214 U.S. 297, 300 (1909) (noting that carriers may not
discriminate between markets in granting preference of stopping commodity in transit).
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against other persons traveling over the road. In other words, it was
not intended to ignore the principle that one can sell at wholesale
cheaper than at retail. It is not all discriminations or preferences that
fall within the inhibition of the statute, only such as are unjust or
unreasonable.
233
Thus, in attempting to interpret the ICA, the Court recognized and
effectively ratified a specific social context that the Act, according to the
Court, left undisturbed, i.e., a competitive market for rail services in
which railroads pursue their interests in bargains with shippers and
passengers who are also pursuing their own interests. 34 In this market,
the Court believed, it was "customary" for carriers to grant lower prices
to certain classes of passengers in the hope, one presumes, of gaining a
competitive advantage.
In addition to treating the competitive market as a background
assumption of the ICA, in at least three cases interpreting key provisions
of the Act, the Supreme Court concluded over the ICC's opposition that
market competition justified discriminatory or preferential practices by
railroads.2 35 The Court's general position on this subject is nicely, if
somewhat colorfully, summed up as follows:
Competition, free and unrestricted, is the general rule which governs
all the ordinary business pursuits and transactions of life. Evils, as
well as benefits, result therefrom. In the fierce heat of competition,
the stronger competitor may crush out the weaker; fluctuations in
prices may be caused that result in wreck and disaster; yet, balancing
the benefits as against the evils, the law of competition remains as a
controlling element in the business world. That free and unrestricted
competition in the matter of railroad charges may be productive of
evils does not militate against the fact that such is the law now
governing the subject.236
The Court acknowledged and endorsed this "law of competition" despite
the ICA's silence about the role, if any, of a competitive market in
determining what conduct by a railroad was or was not lawful. By
invoking market-based arguments to interpret the ICA, the Court
articulated another key element of the post-Enlightenment paradigm and
incorporated it into the ICA's system of railroad regulation.
233. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 145 U.S. at 276.
234. For a skeptical discussion of whether the railroad industry was in fact
competitive during this period, see Harbeson, supra note 103, at 231-32.
235. See infra notes 237-259 and accompanying text.
236. U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 337 (1897) (quoting U.S. v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58, 94 (1893) (Shiras, J., dissenting), rev'd, 166 U.S.
290 (1897)).
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The Court first relied on market competition as a background
assumption in the 1896 Texas & Pacific case 237 interpreting ICA § 2,
which, as discussed above, prohibits charging different rates (higher or
lower) for "like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a
like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions., 238  The case arose because the Texas & Pacific Railway
charged a lower rate to transship imported goods originating in England
under so-called "through bills of lading" from New Orleans to San
Francisco than the company charged to ship like goods manufactured
domestically from New Orleans to San Francisco. 239  The company
claimed that it had charged the lower rate to transport English-origin
goods because otherwise those goods would have traveled directly from
Liverpool to San Francisco by ship via Cape Horn, or by ship and rail via
Panama, instead of offloading in New Orleans for shipment by rail.240
The primary issue before the Court in Texas & Pacific was whether
the circumstances and conditions for transporting domestic goods from
New Orleans to San Francisco were substantially similar to the
circumstances and conditions for transporting imported goods; more
specifically, the Court considered whether competition for the
transportation of imported goods rendered the circumstances and
conditions legally dissimilar.24' Prior to the court case, the ICC had held
that the two kinds of traffic were substantially similar, and that the ICA
did not allow it to consider the market competition cited by the
railroad.242 The Court rejected the ICC's interpretation of the ICA,
holding
that among the circumstances and conditions to be considered, as
well in the case of traffic originating in foreign ports as in the case of
traffic originating within the limits of the United States, competition
that affects rates should be considered, and in deciding whether rates
and charges made at a low rate to secure foreign freights, which
would otherwise go by other competitive routes, are or are not undue
and unjust, the fair interests of the carrier companies, and the welfare
of the community which is to receive and consume the commodities,
are to be considered .... 243
237. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1896).
238. ICA, ch. 104, § 2, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). See supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
239. 162 U.S. at 217-18.
240. Id. at 205.
241. See id. at 217-218.
242. See id. at 217.
243. Id. at 233-234.
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The Supreme Court provided several arguments for this position,
but two are of interest here. First, the Court offered some observations
"in advance of an examination of the text of the act."' 44 One was that "it
could not be readily supposed that congress intended, when regulating
such commerce, to interfere with and interrupt, much less destroy,
sources of trade and commerce already existing.... in other words,
the Court presumed that Congress would not have wished to destroy
what the Court clearly took to be the existing market for transportation of
imported goods from Liverpool to San Francisco by requiring the Texas
& Pacific to charge rates that would render the company's services
uncompetitive. The Court thus presumed the existence of a market,
bestowed legal significance on that market, and made it a central
component of the ICA's regulatory scheme-all "in advance" of
examining the ICA.
The Supreme Court's second argument for holding that market
competition may render circumstances and conditions legally dissimilar
was that the English courts had reached the same conclusion when
interpreting their railroad laws.246 According to the Court, ICA §§ 2 and
3 were modeled on English legislation. 247 After reviewing the English
case law, the Court concluded:
The English cases establish the rule that, in passing upon the question
of undue or unreasonable preference or disadvantage, it is not only
legitimate, but proper, to take into consideration, besides the mere
differences in charges, various elements, such as the convenience of
the public, the fair interests of the carrier, the relative quantities or
volume of the traffic involved, the relative cost of the services and
profit to the company, and the situation and circumstances of the
respective customers with reference to each other, as competitive or
otherwise.
248
As discussed above, Karl Polanyi argued that England was the first home
of the "great transformation" that resulted in the creation of a market
society from earlier, traditional roots.249 Thus, it is particularly fitting
that the Court would rely on English case law to read into the ICA the
presuppositions of the market society that had blossomed first in England
and then found fertile new soil in the United States during the 19th
244. Id. at 211.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 222.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 232 (quoting ICC v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 43 Fed. 37, 53 (1890))
(emphasis added).
249. See POLANYI, supra note 173, at 46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 113:1
NIHILISM WITH A HAPPY ENDING?
century. 250 By importing the notion of the market economy from its
country of origin, the Court absorbed a key element of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm into its account of our social scheme and the
rules governing that scheme.
The Supreme Court made similar use of arguments based on market
competition in two other early cases interpreting the ICA. In Alabama
Midland,25' the question was whether, under the ICA's long and short
haul clause,252 a railroad could charge less to haul goods from Point A to
the "long haul" Point C than it charged to haul the same goods over the
same line to the intervening "short haul" Point B if there were
competition for traffic (by river) to Point C, but not for traffic to Point
B. 253  The Court answered the question in the affirmative.254  Again,
nothing in the text of the long and short haul clause required the Court to
reach this conclusion. To justify relying on the market as a background
assumption, the Court cited not only the Texas & Pacific case, but also,
again, English case law, even though the English courts had focused on
what circumstances constitute an "undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage, 255 and not on what conditions or circumstances might justify
charging more for a long than a short haul.256 The Court's reliance on
English cases that were of questionable relevance shows the lengths to
which the Court was prepared to go to justify treating the competitive
market as a premise of its interpretation of the ICA.257
The third important case showing the influence of the market
premise on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ICA, i.e., the
250. For a summary of this economic history, see Part IV.A.1.
251. ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144 (1897). For an illuminating
discussion of the background to the Alabama Midland case, see Harbeson, supra note
103, at 237-240.
252. ICA, ch. 104, § 4, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). See supra notes 112-113 and
accompanying text.
253. See 168 U.S. at 163.
254. See id. at 166.
255. Id. at 164.
256. See id.
257. For a more extreme case, see ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 190 U.S.
273, 281 (1903) (railroad may lawfully charge for carrying freight from Point A to an
intervening short-haul Point B the shipping price from Point A to the competitive long-
haul Point C plus the shipping price from Point C back to Point B).
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Louisville & Nashville258 case, was a complex variation on the long and
short haul scenario. There the Court declared that
[w]hat was decided in the previous cases was that under the 4th
section of the act substantial competition which materially affected
transportation and rates might, under the statute, be competent to
produce dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions, to be taken
into consideration by the carrier in charging a greater sum for a lesser
than for a longer haul. The meaning of the law was not decided to be
that one kind of competition could be considered and not another
kind, but that all competition, provided it possessed the attributes of
producing a substantial and material effect upon traffic and rate
making, was proper under the statute to be taken into
consideration.
259
Thus, the Court left no doubt about the significance of competition in the
market for rail services as a premise for interpreting the ICA. Show us
actual evidence of competition affecting your rates, the Court seemed to
say, and we will bless that competition as a legitimate basis for charging
different rates under the ICA.
In two of the three cases just discussed, Justice Harlan dissented.260
If in dissent he rejected the Court's presumption that the presence of a
competitive market was legally relevant to the interpretation of the ICA,
then it would follow that he had rejected one of the key elements of the
post-Enlightenment paradigm. This in turn would mean, a fortiori, that
his interpretation of the ICA did not reflect, let alone endorse, the
paradigm. It would then follow that the paradigm was, at best, only one
possible model or account of society that found traction within the Court,
but not the sole, unquestioned model or account. In fact, Justice Harlan's
dissents tend to reinforce the paradigmatic importance of the market. He
clearly rejects the Court's conclusions, as one would anticipate in a
dissenting opinion. But his arguments suggest that he disagrees with the
Court not over whether there is a market for railroad services or for
goods shipped over railroads, but over how to define the scope of the
258. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U.S. 648, 662-663 (1900). The issue
in Louisville & Nashville was not whether competition for freight running from Point A
to long-haul Point C would justify a lower rate between A and C than between A and the
intervening short-haul Point B. Rather, the issue was whether competition between
traffic running from Point A to Point C and traffic running from Point D to Point C might
justify charging a lower rate between A and C than between A and intervening Point B.
See id. at 654. The idea was that the relatively low cost of traffic between Points D and C
might drive out trade between Points A and C, unless the railroad could charge fares that
were low enough to make traffic from A to C competitive. See id.
259. Id. at 670-671.
260. See ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 176 (1897); see Texas & P.
Ry. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 239 (1896).
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market that is legally relevant under the ICA. For example, in the Texas
& Pacific case, Justice Harlan wrote:
I concur entirely with the commission when it further declared: "One
paramount purpose of the act to regulate commerce, manifest in all its
provisions, is to give to all dealers and shippers the same rates for
similar services rendered by the carrier in transporting similar freight
over its line. Now, it is apparent from the evidence in this case that
many American manufacturers, dealers, and localities, in almost
every line of manufacture and business, are the competitors of
foreign manufacturers, dealers, and localities for supplying the wants
of American consumers at interior places in the United States, and
that under domestic bills of lading they seek to require from
American carriers like service as their foreign competitors in order to
place their manufactured goods, property, and merchandise with
interior consumers. The act to regulate commerce secures them this
right."26
Justice Harlan then asked: "[a]re all the interests represented by those
who handle, manufacture, and deal in American goods and merchandise
that go into the markets of this country to be subordinated to the
necessities or greed of railroad corporations? ' 262  By posing this
rhetorical question, Justice Harlan apparently meant to draw attention to
the fact that there arguably were two markets involved in the case: a
market for railroad services and a market for goods shipped by railroad.
If this interpretation of Justice Harlan's point is correct, then the ICA,
according to Harlan and the ICC, was intended to ensure that
discrimination in the market for railroad services did not skew
competition in the market for goods shipped. By requiring railroad
companies to charge the same rates for like goods shipped from Point A
to Point B regardless of the origin of the goods, the ICA (according to
Harlan and the ICC) aimed to neutralize the impact of agreements
between individuals in the market for railroad services on competition
between individuals in the market for goods. Thus, one presumes, goods
shipped on a railroad subject to the ICC should sell or not sell according
to their merits and not according to whether the producer/shipper had
negotiated a special deal with the railroad.
Justice Harlan made a similar, albeit less explicit, argument in the
Alabama Midland case. Rejecting the Supreme Court's view that the
long and short haul clause permitted railroads to take into account
competition at the long-haul destination when setting rates, he wrote:
261. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 162 U.S. at 239.
262. Id. at 252.
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The judgment in this case, if I do not misapprehend its scope and
effect, proceeds upon the ground that railroad companies, when
competitors for interstate business at certain points, may, in order to
secure traffic for and at those points, establish rates that will enable
them to accomplish that result, although such rates may discriminate
against intermediate points. Under such an interpretation of the
statutes in question, they may well be regarded as recognizing the
authority of competing railroad companies engaged in interstate
commerce-when their interests will be subserved thereby-to build
up favored centers of population at the expense of the business of the
country at large.
263
As in the Texas & Pacific case, Justice Harlan juxtaposes the market for
railroad services with another market, here termed "the business of the
country at large." Although his argument is somewhat cryptic, he
appears to mean that if railroad companies may charge lower rates to
competitive long-haul destinations than to intermediate short-haul
destinations, the former will grow and flourish at the expense of the latter
because the latter will not be able to compete in the market for goods
shipped by rail. In other words, higher rail shipping rates will distort the
market for goods moving to and from intermediate destinations. Justice
Harlan again implies that the goal of the ICA was to neutralize or at least
limit the distorting impact of agreements in the market for rail services
on the market for goods shipped by rail-"the business of the country at
large." As in the Texas & Pacific case, however, Justice Harlan
expresses no doubt about the underlying premise that there is a market
for goods shipped by rail and the corollary that a key aim of the ICA was
to preserve the competitive operation of that market. If majority and
dissent agreed that one or more markets exist and that preserving
competitive markets was an aim of the ICA, then a key element of the
post-Enlightenment paradigm, i.e., the market, clearly had become an
integral and seemingly unquestioned component of the entire Court's
thinking about rail regulation under the ICA.
It is important to draw attention to a detail that easily might be
overlooked in the preceding examination of the Supreme Court's uses of
the notions of the individual and the market: the Court's failure to
recognize that these notions were not timeless Platonic forms written into
the nature of things, but that they actually emerged and achieved their
modem significance only in roughly the hundred years before 1887.264
In the Court's ICC jurisprudence, the notions of the individual and the
market have no history. The individual and the market simply are.
263. Id. at 176-177.
264. For a summary of this history, see supra Part IV.A. 1.
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Because these notions and their real-world correlates had no history, the
Court was not forced to acknowledge that there might have been a time
when they did not exist in their modem form, a time when the "real
world" consisted not of individuals trading in markets, but of members of
families, communities and other groups trying to achieve shared visions
of a good human life.265 The latter was the world that Aristotle described
and that existed, according to Polanyi, at most times and places in human
history until the late 18th century.266 Because the Court did not
acknowledge the history of the paradigm of individuals trading in
markets, the Court also could avoid considering the possibility of an
alternative paradigm that might have merited discussion when
interpreting the ICA. In the absence of any recognized alternative, the
post-Enlightenment paradigm emerged without discussion as the
paradigm-the normal, natural, timeless, and seemingly inevitable
premise of any account of human life.
It may be useful at this point to deal with an objection to the
argument thus far presented. In this discussion of the role of the market
in the Supreme Court's ICA jurisprudence, have I not simply
rediscovered something that has become almost a clich6 in discussions of
the Court covering the period from roughly 1860 through 1920, namely
the Court's supposed laissez-faire bias? Isn't this just another example
of, in Justice Holmes's famous phrase from the Lochner dissent, the
Court's seeking to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics? ' 267 The
answer to these questions is "yes and no." Yes, when the Court
recognized the existence of markets for rail services and goods shipped
by rail and declared that competition in such markets may justify fare
differentials under the ICA,268 the Court adopted an approach reminiscent
of its occasional laissez-faire interpretations of the 14 th Amendment.269
But no, it would be a mistake to dismiss the Court's work on the ICA as
the statutory equivalent of the now widely rejected laissez-faire
265. See supra notes 173-185 and accompanying text.
266. See id.
267. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of Spencer's Social Statics, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM tN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 40 (1983) ("Social Statics... was an attempt to strengthen laissez
faire with the imperatives of biology.").
268. See supra IV.A.3 (discussing the role of markets in the Court's interpretation of
the ICA).
269. For balanced discussions of the role of laissez-faire thinking in judicial decisions
between 1860 and 1920, see Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation
During the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63 (1985). See also Hall,
supra note 115, at 221-225, 238-246. Hall finds that "in most instances" courts were not
hostile to legislation limiting the operation of markets. Id. at 226.
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constitutionalism. 2 70 Rather, I would suggest, the Court's work on the
ICA as well as its work on the 14 th amendment reflected the emergence
of the post-Enlightenment paradigm as an increasingly widely shared
framework for understanding the modem world and our place in it.
271
As I already have noted, the majority and the dissent in the Supreme
Court's key ICA cases shared the premise of a market economy and
differed only on how broadly to define the relevant market when
interpreting the ICA. Moreover, despite the Court's disagreement with
the ICC over the outcomes of the cases discussed above, the Court
apparently shared the market premise with the ICC itself. The evidence
for this assertion is unequivocal. The first chairman of the ICC, Thomas
M. Cooley, was, in the words of Professor Hall, "one of the nation's
most influential writers of legal treatises that advocated laissez-faire.,
272
This suggests that President Cleveland, who appointed Cooley, must
have had some sympathy for the outlook that Cooley was known to .hold
regarding regulation of the market. And, lest someone argues that
Cooley was an outlier on the ICC, it should be recalled that Justice
Harlan quoted the opinion of the ICC majority in his Texas & Pacific
dissent, 273 expressing his agreement that the ICC should be allowed to
restrict the role of the market for rail services and thereby preserve the
market for goods transported by rail. There was, in short, little
disagreement by the 1890s about the existence and legal significance of
markets or the market, but there was disagreement about when it was
appropriate to restrict the particular market for rail services so that a
broader market for goods shipped by rail might thrive.274 If strict
adherents to the doctrine of laissez faire favor simply leaving markets
alone, then none of the key participants in the development of ICA
jurisprudence could be called strict adherents because they all recognized
that markets and the market were central, but they also accepted without
270. For instance, Michael Benedict has observed that "[n]othing can so damn a
decision as to compare it to Lochner and its ilk." Michael L. Benedict, Laissez-Faire and
Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293,295 (1985).
271. It is beyond the scope of this Article to defend this suggestion, but I believe it
merits further investigation.
272. HALL, supra note 115, at 205. Cooley's best-known book, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATE
OF THE AMERICAN UNION, which was published immediately after the Civil War, went
through more than a dozen editions. Id. at 222. For a discussion of Cooley's role on the
ICC, see HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 19-31. For a broader reassessment of
Cooley's work, see Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism ": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967).
273. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
274. For a discussion of this disagreement, see supra notes 261-263.
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discussion that the ICA imposed restrictions on the market.275
Disagreements arose over the extent to which the ICA incorporated the
market and, conversely of course, the extent to which the ICA limited the
market. As discussed in Part IV.B, the Court hammered out its
understanding of the ICC's role on the anvil of these disagreements, and
thereby incorporated into a larger interpretative framework the key
elements of the post-Enlightenment paradigm, i.e., the individual, the
market, and the administrative bureaucracy.
Before turning to the discussion of administrative bureaucracy, it is
useful to recall again why such a bureaucracy is thought necessary in a
world that consists of individuals trading in markets. As discussed at the
conclusion of Part IV.A.2, the individual that the Supreme Court read
into the ICA is a bearer of interests and preferences who pursues those
interests and preferences through bargains with other individuals. The
venue for those bargains is the market. When two individuals agree to
exchange one thing of value, e.g., money, for another thing of value, e.g.,
transportation services via railroad, the exchange will reflect the interests
and preferences of the individuals. Just as the interests and preferences
are surds without rational basis, so the agreed exchange that reflects
those interests and preferences will have no rational basis. It simply is
the agreement these two individuals reached at this time with respect to
this subject matter. The agreement reflects their personal values. The
market as an institution may provide an orderly space within which
individuals can achieve their preferences by, for example, comparing
various levels of service at various prices. However, the only limit the
market places on the "all is permitted" realm of individual values,
interests, and preferences is that the individual must find someone else
who is willing to supply what the individual wants for a price the
individual is prepared to pay. What the individual wants and what the
individual is prepared to pay are sovereign choices of the individual and
not subject to further rational debate.276 Thus, one might characterize the
market as a state of ordered nihilism-a manifestation of the "happy
ending" of nihilism to which Bloom ironically points.277
As should be clear from the cases discussed above, however, the
ending for which two individuals bargain in the market is often not
particularly happy for everyone. Shippers of widgets made in the United
Kingdom may get a better deal on rail freight from New Orleans to the
275. I am aware of no argument in any Supreme Court opinion on the ICA during the
period from 1887 to 1912 supporting a pure laissez-faire interpretation of the Act.
276. Contract law clearly reflects this view: "[als a general rule the courts do not
review the adequacy of the consideration." JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO
ON CONTRACTS 178 (5th ed. 2003).
277. See BLOOM, supra note 34 at 147, and accompanying text.
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West Coast than shippers of identical widgets manufactured in the
United States. A sweetheart deal between shipper and railroad covering
transportation of goods to a competitive long-haul destination may harm
shippers and buyers operating from an intervening non-competitive
short-haul destination. Entire communities might be ruined
economically by a railroad that, for whatever reason, is not prepared to
provide them with service at a competitive price. In general, very
aggressive dealing by large or skillful players-shippers as well as
railroads-may destroy other players.278 The "losers" in these scenarios
may find that their values, interests, and preferences are simply ignored
or overridden by other individuals in the market. Instability and the
potential for chaos always lurk in the wings, as the market leaves some
individual interests or preferences unsatisfied or worse, sowing fear
among market participants who therefore demand some form of
oversight from outside the market itself. As discussed in the following
Part, under the ICA the function of the ICC was to keep instability and
the possibility of market collapse at bay.
B. Administrative Bureaucracy in the Supreme Court's Interpretation
of the ICA
As indicated in the preceding Part, no one involved in the debate
over how to interpret the ICA could properly be called an advocate of
pure laissez faire because no one denied that the ICA regulated the
market for railroad services.279 Similarly, to my knowledge, no one
denied that the ICC had been created to oversee that market, so debate
about the role of the ICC inevitably took the form of a disagreement
about the extent of ICC power in what everyone conceded was a
regulated market. Debate over the ICC was, in other words, a very early
example of the broader political debate in the "culture of bureaucratic
individualism" over the extent to which the bureaucracy would limit the
individual's sovereign choices in the market.28°
Every Supreme Court decision in a case under the ICA explicitly or
implicitly delineates, or comments on, the role and function of the ICC,
because the ICA established the ICC to interpret and enforce the Act,281
and the ICA cases that reached the Court almost always were appeals
from ICC decisions. To keep the discussion of the ICC to a manageable
278. For a list of the "evils" perpetrated in and by the market on some consumers of
rail services before Congress adopted the ICA, see supra note 106 and accompanying
text.
279. See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
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length, this Part focuses on cases dealing with three topics. Part IV.B. 1
examines the key cases defining the ICC's authority--or lack of
authority-to set rates for railroad freight. Part IV.B.2 discusses the
absence of standards underlying ICC decision-making, and the
significance of the Court's apparent acknowledgement of that absence.
Part IV.B.3 examines the often invisible process by which the ICC
bureaucracy extended its power over individuals operating in the market
for railroad services. As the argument will show, in the post-
Enlightenment era, with almost no fanfare, bureaucratic power intervenes
to maintain the order that otherwise might dissolve in a market where
emotivist individuals pursue their interests and preferences.
1. The ICC & Rate-Setting
From the outset, the ICC had assumed that it possessed the authority
to set a reasonable rate for freight in cases in which it found that rates set
by railroads were unreasonable, and accordingly the agency had
attempted to set rates in many early cases. z82 The question whether the
ICC actually possessed such rate-setting authority first came before the
Supreme Court in the 1896 Social Circle case.283 Although the Court
reversed the ICC and found that the rate set by the railroad was
reasonable,284 it nevertheless commented in dictum on whether the ICC
could set rates in a case in which the railroad's rates were not reasonable.
The Court stated:
We do not find any provision of the act that expressly, or by
necessary implication, confers such a power. It is argued on behalf of
the commission that the power to pass upon the reasonableness of
existing rates implies a right to prescribe rates. This is not
necessarily so. The reasonableness of the rate, in a given case,
depends on the facts, and the function of the commission is to
consider these facts and give them their proper weight. If the
commission, instead of withholding judgment in such a matter until
an issue shall be made and the facts found, itself fixes a rate, that rate
is prejudged by the commission to be reasonable. 285
Having concluded that rate-setting was not consistent with the ICC's role
as adjudicator of facts in disputed cases, the Court borrowed language
from an early (1890) lower court opinion interpreting the ICA to explain
the alternative to ICC rate-setting authority:
282. See SHARFMAN, 1 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 25-
26.
283. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184 (1896).
284. See id. at 195-196.
285. Id. at 196-197.
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Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be
unjust or unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate,
so as to give undue preference or disadvantage to persons or traffic
similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate commerce leaves
common carriers as they were at the common law,-free to make
special contracts looking to the increase of their business, to classify
their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the
necessities of commerce, and generally to manage their important
interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound, and
adopted in other trades and pursuits.
286
The Court thus saw two options-either railroads set rates via the market
in light of their own interests or the ICC sets rates. It should be noted
that even in this early case, the two options identified by the Court were
precisely the two options offered by the post-Enlightenment paradigm:
either individual choice determines the market price or the administrative
bureaucracy determines the market price and restricts individual choice.
According to the Court, Congress had adopted the former option in the
ICA, leaving railroads to set prices, make deals, and generally pursue
their interests and preferences as individuals in the market within what
we saw in Part IV.A.3 are the very broad, market-oriented limits set by
the ICA.
Despite the Supreme Court's clear statement in the Social Circle
case denying the ICC rate-setting authority, the Court addressed the issue
again in considerably more detail in the 1897 Maximum Freight Rate
case. 287  In contrast to the Social Circle case, where the Court had
identified two alternatives, this time the Court found that
[tihere were three obvious and dissimilar courses open for
consideration. Congress might itself prescribe the rates, or it might
commit to some subordinate tribunal this duty, or it might leave with
the companies the right to fix rates, subject to regulations and
restrictions, as well as to that rule which is as old as the existence of
common carriers, to wit, that rates must be reasonable.
288
The Court immediately rejected the first option, commenting that
"[t]here is nothing in the act fixing rates. Congress did not attempt to
exercise that power, and, if we examine the legislative and public history
of the day, it is apparent that there was no serious thought of doing
so.''289  It is noteworthy that the Court never seriously questioned
286. Id. at 197 (quoting ICC v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 43 Fed. 37, 50-51 (1890),
ajfd, 145 U.S. 263 (1892)).
287. See Cincinnati, N.O. & T.PRy. Co., 167 U.S. 479.
288. Id. at 494.
289. Id.
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whether in principle Congress had the power to set rates or could assign
that power to the ICC.290 It thus became an unargued premise of all
future discussion that a properly authorized federal administrative agency
could supersede the rate-setting power of the individual/corporation in
the market. In this way with no fanfare or discussion, the Court
implicitly accepted bureaucratic individualism-i.e., the symbiotic
relationship between individual and bureaucracy in the market-as a
possibility with which we henceforth would have to live.29 1
Having concluded that Congress did not set rates and presumed that
an agency with proper authority could set rates, the only question was
whether the ICC actually had rate-setting authority.292 Here the Supreme
Court reached the same conclusion that it had reached before:
The question debated is whether [Congress] vested in the commission
the power and the duty to fix rates, and the fact that this is a debatable
question, and has been most strenuously and earnestly debated, is
very persuasive that it did not. The grant of such a power is never to
be implied. The power itself is so vast and comprehensive, so largely
affecting the rights of carrier and shipper, as well as indirectly all
commercial transactions, the language by which the power is given
had been so often used, and was so familiar to the legislative mind,
and is capable of such definite and exact statement, that no just rule
of construction would tolerate a grant of such power by mere
implication.
293
Translating this passage into the language of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, one might say that it is a premise of our social scheme that
individuals/corporations set the prices for goods and/or services through
bargains that they make with one another in the market. The Court
announced that, in the absence of clear statutory language to the
contrary, it would presume that Congress intended to endorse this market
premise of our social scheme--despite the lack of evidence that
Congress intended such an endorsement. By choosing the proper
language, however, Congress could empower the third component of the
paradigm, the administrative bureaucracy, to set prices and thereby
override the power of the individual/corporation in the market. To
underline the point, the Court provided an exhaustive discussion of
existing state laws governing railroad rates, indicating which formulae
290. See id. at 505 ("The words and phrases efficacious to make such a delegation of
power are well understood, and have been frequently used .... ").
291. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing bureaucratic
individualism).
292. See 167 U.S. at 494.
293. Id. at 494-495.
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legislatures used when empowering state administrative agencies to take
294
over rate-setting.
Justice Harlan dissented in the Maximum Freight Rate case without
filing an opinion, 95 and some scholars examining the ICC have decried
the outcome of the case. The Hoogenbooms, for example, describe the
Maximum Freight Rate result as one of several "disastrous defeats," and
observe that "the ICC lost to the courts its fundamental power to fix
rates. 296  Rabin observes that "since the Commission was otherwise
limited to issuing retroactive, nonpunitive cease and desist orders, its
determinations had virtually no impact without the authority to declare
an appropriate charge for the future. 297  According to Rabin, the
Maximum Freight Rate case was evidence of the Court's "strong and
hostile" response to the ICC, and this supports his conclusion that the
Court "seriously mistrust[ed] the administrative capacity to adjudge rates
fairly." 298  Along the same lines, Skowronek argues that "[t]he
commission was, in effect, held to be exclusively a ward of the Court
rather than an arm of the legislature, and like a court, it could only pass
on the reasonableness of a past action., 299 In contrast to this critical
literature, Kolko has commented that "the Court was correct in
questioning... whether the Commission ever had the ability to
determine a rate in the first place, 300 and Nelson apparently concurs.3 °1
Discussing the Maximum Freight Rate case among others, Ely also
rejects the conclusions of those who "have accused the Supreme Court of
emasculating the commission., 302  He adds: "[t]his line of decisions
unquestionably reflected the Court's favorable disposition toward private
economic ordering and skepticism about business regulations. The basic
problems with the act, however, were the responsibility of Congress. 30 3
This long-running scholarly debate over the ICC's early rate-setting
authority and the merits of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
294. See id. at 495-500.
295. Id. at 512.
296. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 35. In fact, of course, the ICC "lost" the
power to the railroads, which had had the power from the outset.
297. Rabin, supra note 76, at 1214.
298. Id. at 1215.
299. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 157 (1982). See
SHARFMAN, I INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 27 (noting the
"inability of the Commission, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of its authority, to
carry out the primary purposes of the Act").
300. KOLKO, supra note 103, at 82.
301. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900,
at 131 (1982) (noting that "the courts did not do violence to the legislative history"
through their interpretation of the ICA).
302. ELY, supra note 107, at 95.
303. Id.
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Maximum Freight Rate case is, of course, interesting from a historical
perspective and was once fraught with economic significance for all
concerned.3 °4 However, the debate tends to distract attention from the
unchallenged consensus about the fundamental terms of the debate as
framed by the Court--either the ICC has rate-setting power in certain
circumstances or the railroads retain power to set rates via the market.
And these terms reflect the basic structure of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm: bureaucracy supervising-to a greater or lesser extent-
individuals who act on their interests and preferences in markets.
Indeed, one might speculate that the intractability of the long-running
debate about the ICC's claimed rate-setting power may have reinforced
in all participants the belief that there really were and are no alternatives
to individual/corporate rate-setting via the market and rate-setting by an
administrative bureaucracy. The possibility of an alternative world
without a bureaucracy, a market, or individuals pursuing their non-
rational preferences, a world of the sort modernity had begun to eclipse
only a few decades earlier, 30 5 did not receive serious consideration by the
306Court. In the absence of any apparent alternative, the post-
Enlightenment paradigm came by default to define the terms of the
debate. And not surprisingly, when Congress revised the ICA in the
1906 Hepburn Act, Congress simply shifted from one paradigmatic
alternative to the other, i.e., away from individual/corporate rate-setting
in the market and toward ICC power to set maximum rates in cases
where existing rates were found to be unreasonable.30 7  The Supreme
Court approved the ICC's use of this new authority without significant
comment, 30 8 and thus reinforced the post-Enlightenment paradigm as the
unspoken premise and framework for policy debates about the railroad
industry.
2. ICC Authority & Expertise: Power Without Standards
This Part argues that when one examines the Supreme Court's
infrequent comments on the nature of and justification for ICC authority,
304. If the ICC could set a maximum rate for freight, then the ICC could limit the
profitability of shipping along particular lines and potentially limit the profitability of the
railroad as a whole. All other things being equal, every dollar that the railroad could not
extract in shipping charges on goods because of ICC-imposed limits, the shipper could
pocket after selling those goods. Thus, the key players had a significant financial stake in
the debate.
305. See supra Part IV.A.1.
306. I am aware of no discussion by the Court of an alternative model to what I have
termed the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
307. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906).
308. See ICC v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 88 (1910) (enforcing an
ICC order setting maximum rates under authority of Hepburn Act).
2008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
one finds clear traces of the nihilism that gave rise to the post-
Enlightenment paradigm. Thus, not surprisingly, the Court's comments
on ICC authority also tend to reflect the paradigm's rationales for
granting administrative bureaucracy power over the market and thereby
endorse the paradigm as the framework for discussions about
administrative government. To understand the Court's view of the
nature of and justification for ICC authority, it is useful to classify the
ICC under Professor Rabin's typology of regulatory models. 39  From
Rabin's perspective, it seems clear that the ICC was a policing agency
and not a market-corrective agency between its inception in 1887 and the
passage of the Hepburn Act in 1906. The ICC could police excessively
competitive behavior in the market, such as unreasonable rates and
violations of the long and short haul provision, but the ICC could not
intervene more directly to correct market outcomes by setting rates.310
Thus, as expected under the policing model, in the early years, ICC
intervention tended to support the autonomy of the market by deterring
excessively competitive behavior that might otherwise lead to market
breakdown. After the adoption of the Hepburn Act, the ICC assumed
increasing authority to set rates and alter market outcomes, and thus the
ICC began to evolve from a policing to a market-corrective agency.31'
As the ICC evolved, power in the market necessarily shifted from
individual/corporation to administrative bureaucracy. Under both of
Rabin's models, however, it is clear that the ICC operated within the
nexus of individual-market-bureaucracy defined by the post-
Enlightenment paradigm.
During the period when the ICC was a policing agency, the
Supreme Court adopted a very restrictive view of the scope of ICC
authority. According to the Court, "[t]he power given [to the ICC] is the
power to execute and enforce, not to legislate. The power given is partly
judicial, partly executive and administrative, but not legislative. 312 The
ICC could declare past or current rates unreasonable and past or current
conduct unjust, but the ICC could not prescribe future rates or conduct.31 3
Moreover, the Court treated the ICC as what administrative lawyers
309. For a discussion of Rabin's models, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying
text.
310. See supra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing the evolution of ICC rate-setting authority).
311. See supra notes 307-308 and accompanying text.
312. ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 501 (1897).
For a discussion of the ways courts have used the distinction between legislative and
administrative judicial acts, see Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 170-73 (1965).
313. See supra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing the evolution of ICC rate-setting authority).
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would later call an "adjunct" to the judiciary.314 The ICC was a "body
not authorized to make a final judgment, but to investigate and make
orders which may or may not be finally embodied in judgments or
decrees of the court., 315 Because the courts reserved the authority to
review ICC decisions de novo,316 Rabin concluded that the ICC "might
police the market, but only so long as the final authority remained in the
courts."
3 17
Despite treating the ICC as formally an adjunct of the judiciary, the
Supreme Court in practice deferred, or required deference, to the agency
in certain circumstances, and it is in the rationale for deference that one
finds indications of the nihilism that generated the post-Enlightenment
paradigm. What is the evidence for this somewhat surprising claim?
The Court held that the ICC, not the federal courts, had primary
jurisdiction over all questions of fact.318 This is important because
among the so-called "questions of fact" over which the ICC had primary
jurisdiction were whether rates charged by a railroad were reasonable
and whether discrimination between individual shippers by a railroad
was due or undue. 31 9 Thus, the Court treated what would appear to be
questions of value, e.g., whether rates were unreasonable or
discrimination was undue or unjust, as questions of fact. According to
the Court, the alternative to recognizing the ICC's primary jurisdiction
over such questions would be disorder and a lack of uniformity in the
market for railroad services:
unless all courts reached an identical conclusion[,] a uniform standard
of rates in the future would be impossible, as the standard would
fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached
314. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122-23
(2d ed. 2001).
315. ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25,43 (1904).
316. See ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896) (ICC's
findings are prima facie evidence but, "in a trial in the court, [neither party] is to be
restricted to the evidence that was before the commission"). For a discussion of this
issue, see Rabin, supra note 76, at 1212-13.
317. Rabin, supra note 76, at 1215.
318. See ICC v. Clyde Steamship Co., 181 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1901) ("[W]here the
Commission by reason of its erroneous construction of the statute had.., declined to
adequately find the facts, it [is] the duty of the courts ... not to proceed to an original
investigation of the facts which should have been passed upon by the Commission, but to
correct the error of law committed by that body, and, after doing so, to remand the case to
the Commission so as to afford it the opportunity of examining the evidence and finding
the facts as required by law."); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197, 238 (1896)
("[D]efendant was entitled to have its defense considered, in the first instance, at least, by
the commission, upon a full consideration of all the circumstances and conditions upon
which a legitimate order could be founded.").
319. See Tex. &Pac.Ry. Co.,162 U.S. at 238.
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as to reasonableness by the various courts called upon to consider the
subject as an original question.320
In the Court's view, therefore, the question whether a rate is reasonable
is one on which individuals, including individuals who serve as federal
judges and ICC commissioners, may differ. Because smart, well-
informed people may differ, the rationale for recognizing primary
jurisdiction in the ICC was not and presumably could not be that the ICC
has special insight into the correct answers to questions about what
conduct is unreasonable, unjust, or undue. Rather, the Court recognized
primary ICC jurisdiction over these "factual" questions simply because
the ICC as a single, unified federal agency possessed a unique power to
impose on the market a uniform, consistent standard concerning what
rates are unreasonable and what discrimination is unjust or undue. The
Court actively discouraged lower courts from attempting to make
findings about unreasonable or unjust conduct when reviewing ICC
determinations: where the ICC failed to consider particular facts bearing
on the reasonableness of a railroad's conduct because of an erroneous
interpretation of the ICA, a reviewing court generally was expected to
correct the error of law and then remand to the ICC for a new "factual"
determination about the reasonableness of the railroad's conduct. 321 One
may presume that the Court's rationale for requiring remand to the ICC
mirrored its rationale for recognizing primary jurisdiction in the ICC-
i.e., the need for a single, uniform standard of reasonable conduct to be
imposed on the entire market by the unique federal agency with the
power to adopt such a standard.
The Supreme Court is, of course, also a unique federal agency
322
that can impose its views of the law on the entire market, or, indeed, the
entire country. Particularly in the early years, the Court did overrule ICC
findings that railroads had engaged in unreasonable conduct if the ICC
findings were based on an error of law. In the Social Circle case, for
example, the Court overruled the ICC because the agency refused to
allow a railroad to take into account market competition when setting
"reasonable" rates. 323 In effect, the Court required the ICC to adopt the
market as a standard of reasonable conduct for railroads under the
ICA,32 4 meaning that the ICC had to accept as reasonable any bargain
that two individuals (here a railroad and a shipper) struck in a
competitive market based on their individual preferences. But to say that
320. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907).
321. See Clyde Steamship Co., 181 U.S. at 32-33.
322. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
323. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 162 U.S. at 195-96.
324. For an elaboration of this point, see supra Part IV.A.3.
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individual preferences in the market set the standard for individual
conduct is the same as saying there is no standard. From the factual
statement "A and B did X in the market," the Court infers the value
judgment "X is reasonable." This supposed inference simply transforms
a description of individual conduct into a value judgment affirming the
same conduct, bridging by fiat the gap between fact and value that most
post-Enlightenment moral philosophers would find to be unbridgeable. 325
The Supreme Court's approach to ICC jurisdiction and the problem
of reasonableness appears to reflect the same nihilistic doubts about
moral philosophy that gave rise to the post-Enlightenment paradigm.326
We no longer believe we are capable, after the collapse of traditional and
Enlightenment moral theories, of arriving at a true, objective answer to
such questions as whether particular actions are reasonable or
unreasonable, just or unjust.327 In a world where emotivism is the
starting point for moral debate, judges and others inevitably will disagree
about such private value judgments. To avoid the disorder and chaos
that might arise from such disagreement, we need an administrative body
such as the ICC with authority to establish standards and thereby impose
uniformity and order. The order is neither right nor wrong. It simply is
the order. That is its primary, if not its sole, justification, but that is
sufficient given the alternative, i.e., disorder. We label the order that the
ICC imposes on the market "reasonable," but the order is reasonable only
because the ICC says it is and not because it satisfies a non-existent, true
and objective standard of reasonableness. As the Social Circle case
illustrates, the alternative is to label the market outcome itself
"reasonable" simply because it is the market outcome.328 Thus, the
value-laden term "reasonable" functions at least in part as a fiction that
justifies the ICC-imposed order and/or the market-imposed order. Of
course, as long as the ICC followed the policing model, its ability to
impose order was limited. It could determine ex post what rates were
unreasonable but not impose ex ante rates it deemed reasonable, and it
had to rely on the judiciary to bless and enforce its decisions.
After passage of the Hepburn Act converted the ICC into the first
federal market-corrective agency, the Supreme Court announced a more
deferential attitude toward ICC power in the 1910 Illinois Central
case:
329
325. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text (discussing the nihilist roots of the
paradigm).
327. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 323-325 and accompanying text.
329. ICC v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 U.S. 452 (1910).
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in determining whether an order of the [C]ommission shall be
suspended or set aside, we must consider, [(a)] all relevant questions
of constitutional power or right; [(b)] all pertinent questions as to
whether the administrative order is within the scope of the delegated
authority under which it purports to have been made; and, [(c)] ...
whether, even although the order be in form within the delegated
power, nevertheless it must be treated as not embraced therein,
because the exertion of authority which is questioned has been
manifested in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it, in truth, to
be within the elementary rule that the substance, and not the shadow,
determines the validity of the exercise of the power .... [S]uch
perennial powers [of judicial review] lend no support whatever to the
proposition that we may, under the guise of exerting judicial power,
usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside a lawful
administrative order upon our conception as to whether the
administrative power has been wisely exercised.
330
In the same year, the Court showed a similarly deferential attitude in
rejecting a challenge to an ICC decision concerning the reasonableness
of railroad conduct. "Such decision, we have said with tiresome
repetition, is peculiarly the province of the Commission to make, and
that its findings are fortified by presumptions of truth, 'due to the
judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by
experience.' ' 331 Thus, courts should not second-guess the wisdom of
ICC policy because it is the job of the ICC, not the courts, to determine
what policy is wise, just as it is the ICC's job to determine what conduct
is reasonable. In general, courts should endorse the ICC's decisions
because the ICC made them, and not because those decisions were
correct. Indeed, the Court's position makes sense only if one believes
that the ICC sometimes will make decisions that a judge would consider
incorrect and that there is no overarching standard against which to
decide who is correct in such a situation, the judge or the ICC. If an
overarching standard existed and could be applied by the courts, there
would be no justification for deferring to the ICC. As Professor Wilson
argued, the ICC's challenge was "to make binding choices without any
clear standards for choice. 332 Indeed, as already noted, the mere fact
that only the ICC could make market-wide binding choices became the
rationale for granting the ICC power over the market. The ICC alone
could exercise the kind of effective, unified power that would bring order
330. Id. at 470 (citation omitted); see also Rabin, supra note 76, at 1233-34(discussing the significance of the deferential approach announced in Illinois Central).
331. ICC v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 88, 110 (1910) (quoting Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907)).
332. Wilson, supra note 5, at 95.
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to the national market, and, as MacIntyre observed, the appeal to
effectiveness as a justification "reveals that bureaucratic authority is
nothing other than successful power.,
333
One argument that begins to emerge only gradually in the Supreme
Court's early opinions on the ICA is that the ICC deserves deference not
simply because of its unique status and unified structure, but also
because of its competence or expertise in the field of railroad regulation.
As discussed above, under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, claims
about agency expertise or competence become the standard justification
for increasing administrative management of society.334 Although the
evidence here is relatively slender, it appears that the Court moved
gradually toward a theory of agency competence as a rationale for ICC
supervision of the rail industry. In a case from 1900 that focused on
whether competition in a particular market justified a railroad's pricing
decisions, the Court stated that "the law attributes prima facie effect to
the findings of fact made by the Commission, and that body, from the
nature of its organization and the duties imposed upon it by the statute, is
peculiarly competent to pass upon questions of fact of the character here
arising., 335 The Court did not specify the ICC's peculiar competence or
identify what it was about the "nature of its organization" that might
place certain questions within its purview. In a 1907 case, the Court
went further, describing the ICC as
a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience. And in any
special case of conflicting evidence a probative force must be
attributed to the findings of the Commission, which, in addition to
'knowledge of conditions, of environment and of transportation
relations,' has had the witnesses before it and has been able to judge
of them and their manner of testifying.
336
Thus, by 1907, the Court believed the agency had developed broad
competence in the field of rail transportation, and this competence gave
the agency the expertise to evaluate conflicting testimony in contested
cases.
Finally, and perhaps not coincidentally, in one of the earliest cases
under the Hepburn Act, the Court seemed to take another step toward the
position that the ICC's special competence or expertise justifies the
authority the ICC exercises over the market, including the newly granted
authority to set rates under certain circumstances. According to the
Court,
333. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 13, at 26.
334. See supra notes 63, 85-86 and accompanying text.
335. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. BehImer, 175 U.S. 648, 675 (1900).
336. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. ICC, 206 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1907) (citation omitted).
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[f]rom whatever standpoint the powers of the Interstate Commerce
Commission may be viewed, they touch many interests, they may
have great consequences. They are expected to be exercised in the
coldest neutrality. The Commission was instituted to prevent
discrimination between persons and places. It would indeed be an
abuse of its powers to exercise them so as to cause either. And the
training that is required, the comprehensive knowledge which is
possessed, guards or tends to guard against the accidental abuse of its
powers, or, if such abuse occur, to correct it.
33 7
Without using the term "bureaucracy," the Court here implies that the
ICC exemplifies then-emerging notions of the ideal bureaucracy,338
staffed with people who are impersonally neutral, trained, and who
possess "comprehensive knowledge" of the relevant field. According to
the Court, these characteristics enable the bureaucracy to make decisions
without discrimination or favoritism-a conclusion that mirror's
Weber's. 339 It is probably not a coincidence that at the same time the
Court accepted the ICC's new authority to make "legislative, 3
40
decisions setting reasonable future rates under the Hepburn Act, the
Court also came close to arguing that the agency's special competence
justified the broad grant of authority. Greater authority presumably
requires more robust justification. But the Court did not, and presumably
could not, suggest that the ICC's greater competence gave the agency
unique or authoritative insight into what conduct was wise, reasonable,
undue, or unjust. As the Court previously had recognized,34 1 on such
questions reasonable people are likely to disagree, and the Court had
therefore decided that to avoid disunity the ICC's determination
ordinarily will prevail. 342  Thus, as applied to an agency's "value"
judgments about unreasonable, unjust, or undue conduct in the market,
the theory of agency competence functions at least in part as a kind of
fiction to rationalize the power over the market that we must vest in a
single, unified administrative agency if we are to avoid social disorder.
For those given to epigrams, one might say the agency does not have
power because it is competent; it is competent because it has power.
I have argued that the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the premise
that the ICC had no special insight into what sorts of conduct were
reasonable or unreasonable, due or undue, just or unjust, and, as a
337. ICC v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910).
338. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
342. One must add the qualifier "ordinarily" because the Court reserved the authority
to overrule ICC determinations that were based on errors of law. See supra note 321 and
accompanying text.
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corollary, that intelligent people such as ICC commissioners and federal
judges inevitably would disagree on such matters. If my reading is
correct, then the Court's approach seems to reflect the same doubts-
albeit in a considerably milder form-about the existence of rationally
persuasive, objective, universal moral standards that led Nietzsche to
announce God's death and led others to propound emotivism as a default
moral theory. In other words, there appears to be a strong nihilistic
undercurrent to the Court's account of the nature of and justification for
ICC authority. Of course, an emotivist/nihilist view of the ICC would be
entirely consistent with the emotivist/nihilist account of individuals
trading in the market that the Court appears to have found in the ICA.343
Indeed, if one adopts an emotivist view of individuals in the market, it
would be difficult to explain how those individuals can be transformed
into non-emotivist, non-nihilist officials when they are recruited into
administrative service at the ICC. It would also be hard to explain how
we can equip the ICC (or the Supreme Court) with a non-nihilistic,
rationally persuasive, objective, universally valid moral theory to impose
on individuals in the market when we apparently cannot equip the
individuals themselves with the same theory. With emotivism and
nihilism, if one is in for a penny, one is in for a pound. This suggests
again that the Court's invocations of competence to justify ICC actions
actually serve as a cover for what ultimately is an exercise of power by
the ICC that is not and cannot be grounded in a rationally persuasive,
objective moral argument or theory. Bureaucratic power holds in check
the disorderly tendencies of emotivist individuals pursuing their
preferences in the market, thereby allowing the market to function
without dissolving into chaos. 344  Thus, by saving individuals from
themselves, bureaucratic power underwrites nihilism's happy ending.
3. ICC Investigations and the Rise of the Bureaucratic
Corporation
The repeated references to ICC power in Part IV.B.2 may have
created the impression that ICC agents fanned out across the United
States in the 1890s and pointed guns at railroad managers. In fact, as this
Part argues, ICC authority over railroads grew through a much more
subtle process of bureaucratization and bureaucratic oversight at the
agency and within the railroads themselves. An examination of early
Supreme Court cases interpreting the ICA reveals almost no notice-
aside from the Court's remarks in 1910 about the ICC's "coldest
343. See supra Parts IV.A.2, IV.A.3.
344. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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neutrality"-of the fact that the agency was a rapidly expanding
bureaucracy. 345 The ICC was not, of course, the first federal entity to
assume a bureaucratic form. Professor Crenson has argued that the
bureaucratization of the federal government began during Andrew
Jackson's presidency. 346  The civil service reform movement, which
sought to eliminate Jacksonian "spoilsmen" and increase the
professionalism of the federal bureaucracy through merit-based hiring
and promotion, open competitive examinations, and job tenure, came to a
climax with the adoption of the 1883 Pendleton Civil Service Reform
Act. 347 At the ICC itself, within a year of the agency's creation there
were two auditors and 25 clerks supporting the five commissioners.348
By 1899, the ICC's technical staff had burgeoned to 119 clerks, agents,
auditors, and statisticians.349 In 1906, the Hepburn Act expanded the
Commission itself to seven members. 350 As the ICC's responsibilities
grew, so did its staff-to 330 in 1907 and 527 in 1909.351 Yet all of these
developments remained invisible in the opinions of the Supreme Court,
which continued to review the ICC's work in much the same way it
would review the work of a lower court, the staff of which might consist
of one or two clerks and a secretary.
In addition to assisting the ICC with complaints about railroad
misbehavior, what was this growing army of bureaucrats doing? One
clue can be found in an article by Henry C. Adams, who ran the ICC's
Statistical Department from soon after the agency's creation until
1911.352 According to Adams, the ICC's most important
accomplishment during its first decade was to push the railroad industry
itself toward uniformity of administration:
Never in the history of American railways has there been such a
marked movement toward uniformity in administration as during the
last ten years [from 1887 to 1897]. It is not claimed that this has been
accomplished by the commission against the wish of the railways,-
345. See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. at 102 (referring to ICC's
exercise of its powers in "coldest neutrality").
346. MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY
IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 4 (1975).
347. See Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). For a
description of the political struggles that led to the adoption of the Pendleton Act, see ARI
HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS 238-252 (1961).
348. 2 ICC ANN. REP. 174 (1888).
349. 14 ICC ANN. REP. 91-93 (1901).
350. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 8, 34 Stat. 584, 595 (1906).
351. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 103, at 53.
352. Adams was a nationally recognized economist and statistician as well as the first
Johns Hopkins Ph.D. For further information about Adams, see S. Lawrence Bigelow et
al., Henry Carter Adams, 30 J. POL. ECON. 201, 206 (1922) and HOOGENBOOM, supra note
103, at 31.
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indeed, the formal steps have not infrequently been taken upon the
orders of railway managers; but no one who knows the situation can
for a moment believe that they, of their own motion, would have
interested themselves in establishing uniformity of administration to
the extent that it has been established.
353
How did uniformity of administration within the railroad industry arise?
Not surprisingly, Adams suggested that the ICC's interaction-both
formal and informal-with the railroad industry during contested cases
promoted administrative uniformity.354 In addition, he argued that
administrative uniformity resulted from "[t]he development [within the
ICC] of a division of statistics and accounts which, so far as information
is concerned, would place the commission on the same footing as the
[railroad] management itself.' '355  Information gathered by this
specialized division of the ICC bureaucracy would provide "the
groundwork upon which the successful control of railways in the United
States rests.,
356
According to Adams, preparation for ICC control began with a push
for "the development of a uniform system of accounts for the railways
themselves. 35 7 The ICC's goal was to ensure that each railroad had one
accounting system and that all railroads used the same system. As
Adams observed, "if there be but one system of accounts for all
corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, it is necessary
only to master the principles, rules, and classifications of one system in
order to gain a mastery of all. 358 In other words, uniformity among
railroads would facilitate mastery by the ICC's administrative
bureaucracy. According to Adams, the first step toward uniformity was
the development of a "common form for annual report" that railroads
could file with all state commissions as well as with the ICC.35 9 The
second step was to establish a uniform method of classifying expenses
across the railroad industry. 360  From there, the ICC pressed for
353. Adams, supra note 103, at 437.
354. Id. Kolko pointed out that the ICC dealt informally with the vast majority-
nearly 90 percent-of the 9000 complaints filed during its first 18 years. See KOLKO,
supra note 103, at 153. Harbeson defends the ICC's informal approach on the ground
that it saved time and money. See Harbeson, supra note 103, at 236-237. Neither Kolko
nor Harbeson notes the effect that this extensive informal dialogue between regulator and
regulated may have had over time on the administrative structures and actions of the
both.
355. Adams, supra note 103, at 440.
356. Id.
357. Id.; see also ICA, ch. 104, § 20, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887) (ICC authorized to
mandate uniform accounts).
358. Adams, supra note 103, at 440.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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uniformity in "the compilation of train-mileage, the classification of
railway employees, the rules for arriving at daily wages, and the
adjustment of a balance sheet."36'
Adams neglected to discuss another likely stimulus toward
administrative uniformity, i.e., the requirement that each railroad file its
rates and fares with the ICC and then abide by those filed rates and fares
362Fosuha t
unless and until it published and filed a revision. For such a system to
work, a railroad would have to plan a detailed fare schedule in advance.
Large-scale planning for an interstate railroad required personnel and
organization. 363 Thus, like the ICC's information-gathering system, the
filed-rate system may have encouraged railroads to organize, or
reorganize, both their methods of accounting and the underlying
management and planning of rail services, thereby increasing operational
uniformity throughout the industry and enabling the ICC to exercise
power over the industry. As the railroad industry rendered itself
increasingly transparent to the federal administrative bureaucracy, it
apparently oriented itself simultaneously to the needs of bureaucratic
oversight and control. In the language of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, one could say that the individual, i.e., the railroad corporation,
rendered itself amenable to bureaucratic supervision by quite literally
learning to account for itself to the ICC bureaucracy. The railroad
gradually transformed itself into the individual-as-supervised-by-
bureaucracy.
As Henry C. Adams noted, the ICC's push for administrative
uniformity met with a receptive audience in the railroad industry itself.
364
Professor Nelson has argued that "[t]he size of a few of the major
railroads-the Baltimore & Ohio, the Erie, the New York Central, and
the Pennsylvania-made routinization of decisionmaking
unavoidable...,, 365  As a consequence, from the 1850s onward,
"railroads found it necessary through 'a judicious subdivision of labor'
and 'a proper division of responsibilities' to create complex
bureaucracies, each segment of which was responsible for a different
aspect of railroad management., 366 According to Nelson,
361. Id. at441.
362. See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
363. See infra notes 364-369 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between the growth of railroads and the development of bureaucratic management).
364. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
365. NELSON, supra note 301, at 101-102.
366. Id. at 102 (citations omitted). For a description of the complex management
structure of a large railroad circa 1885, see Charles E. Perkins, Administering a Great
Railroad System, in THE RAILROADS, THE NATION'S FIRST BIG BUSINESS 118 (Alfred D.
Chandler ed., 1981).
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these bureaucratized structures were far different from the
management patterns of small, early railroads, in which, as in nearly
all other antebellum businesses, the chief executive of the company
could 'give its business his personal attention, and... be almost
constantly upon the line engaged in the direction of its details.'...367
The early and rapid bureaucratizing of railroad corporations meant that
when the ICC came into existence in 1887, it found itself facing an
increasingly bureaucratic industry. Professor Chandler has studied the
pioneering role of railroads in the development of the modem business
368
organizational structure. He noted the increasing bureaucratization of
railroad management by the early 2 0 th century, when "the process of
ratemaking was being shared with the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which handled the negotiations between sets of shippers and the
railroad. 36 9  With the passage of the Hepburn Act, ICC bureaucrats
gradually took over from railroad bureaucracies the key function of
setting rates for rail services.370 Thus, as the ICC itself bureaucratized
and then began to evolve into a market-corrective agency, its dealings
with the railroad industry were increasingly bureaucracy to bureaucracy
and supervisor to supervised. In the language of the post-Enlightenment
paradigm, one could say that the administrative bureaucracy found itself
overseeing a market consisting of corporate individuals who were
bureaucratizing and, one would therefore presume, increasingly open to
bureaucratic oversight. In the culture of bureaucratic individualism,
therefore, the bureaucracy manages and controls the (corporate)
individual from within and without, thus quietly avoiding any overt
threat or use of force.
The administrative impact of the ICC's information-gathering and
rate-filing processes on the railroad industry typically is overlooked in
legal discussions concerning the ICC.37 1 After the Court held in one
early case that a grand jury investigating alleged violations of the ICA
could not force a witness to testify about some of his actions as a grain
shipper because of the danger of self-incrimination,37 2 Congress passed
an act granting broad immunity from prosecution for testimony before
the ICC.3 73 In the inevitable follow-up case, the Court held that a witness
367. NELSON, supra note 301, at 103 (citation omitted).
368. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 81-187 (1977).
369. Id. at 186.
370. See supra notes 307-308 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
the Hepburn Act).
371. I have seen no discussion of these topics in my review of the legal literature for
this article.
372. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
373. See Compulsory Testimony Act, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, 443-44 (1893).
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could be forced to testify under this newly granted immunity.374 The
Court later held that the ICC could not use its subpoena power to force
E.H. Harriman and other railroad tycoons to reveal personal financial
information.375 However, as long as the ICC did not violate the privacy
of railroad owners, the Court did not interfere with ICC efforts to obtain
information. As the Court stated in 1894, "[i]t was clearly competent for
congress ... to invest the commission with authority to require the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books,
papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any
matter legally committed to that body for investigation.' 376 Matters
legally committed to the Commission included "the management of the
business of carriers subject to the provisions of the act, and ... the whole
,,377subject of interstate commerce as conducted by such carriers....
Because ICC information and rate-filing requirements did not generate
cases for the courts, the transformative effects of those requirements on
the operation of railroads remained largely invisible in judicial writings
on the ICC during the agency's first 25 years. Yet if Adams was correct,
this invisible transformation of railroad operations facilitated expansion
of ICC power over the railroads. No doubt the relative invisibility of the
process itself may have facilitated expansion of ICC power. Power
imposed at gunpoint inevitably attracts attention and typically elicits a
response. Power gradually imposed from the point of a bureaucrat's pen
attracts little notice, and thus order can be maintained in the market as if
by magic.
The Supreme Court's decision to protect Mr. Harriman's financial
dealings from the impact of an ICC subpoena serves as a reminder that,
aside from corporations, there was another type of individual in the
market interacting with railroads and, on occasion, with the ICC. This
was the natural person who, as stockholder/owner, might exercise some
control over the railroad's corporate bureaucracy and who, as shipper or
passenger, would find himself or herself buying services from the
railroad's corporate bureaucracy in the market. Indeed, as shipper or
passenger, the individual person had little choice but to deal with a large
railroad bureaucracy in the market if he or she wished to transport people
or things over land because there was no significant alternative to
railroads for overland shipping. Before the ICA, an increasingly
bureaucratic railroad management determined when and where the trains
374. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896). For a discussion of the early
evolution of the ICC's subpoena power, see SHARFMAN, I INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 23 n. 19.
375. See Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407,417 (1908).
376. ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 473 (1894).
377. Id.
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ran and how much transportation would cost, presumably in light of the
perceived interests of the railroad.378 One would also presume that
shippers negotiated with railroads in the hope of striking a deal that
furthered the shippers' interests. With the adoption of the filed-rate
system, 379 the ICA prohibited the railroad from negotiating special rates
with individual customers. 380  Thus, the individual faced a railroad
bureaucracy offering a legally controlled take-it-or-leave-it proposition.
With passage of the Hepburn Act, the ICC assumed responsibility for
setting rates in certain circumstances, so the individual could take
comfort--or not-in the fact that the railroad bureaucracy with whom he
or she dealt often had no actual control over the rate that the individual
would have to pay. In general, as bureaucratic authority increased first in
the railroads and then at the ICC, the officials and bureaucrats who
exercisedpower over railroad rates became increasingly remote from the
individuals who had to foot the bill for railroad services.
As one would expect in the nascent culture of bureaucratic
individualism, this expansion of bureaucratic power was explained and
justified as a form of protection for the individual. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court repeatedly asserted that the ICA's main purpose was
to ensure that individuals and localities were treated equally and were not
subject to unjust or undue discrimination by railroads.38' Since the ICA
established the ICC to accomplish this purpose, the Court's argument
implies that we ensure equal, non-discriminatory treatment of individuals
by empowering administrative bureaucracies to make more and more of
the key decisions. The bureaucracy thus emerged as the solution to the
individual's transportation problems and, as the line of development
from the original ICA to the Safety Appliance Act to the Hepburn Act
and beyond suggests, we learned to solve each new problem that the
individual encountered in the field of transportation by enhancing the
power of the ICC over transportation of the individual.382 In this way
among others, bureaucracy became part of the fabric of the individual's
life-a supposedly necessary condition for equal, non-discriminatory,
coldly neutral treatment in the national transportation system. At the
same time and for the same reasons, the individual came to be
378. For a discussion of the development of bureaucratic management in the railroad
industry, see supra notes 364-370 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
380. See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906)
(."[W]hatever may be the rate agreed upon, the carrier's lien on the goods is, by force of
the act of Congress, for the amount fixed by the published schedule of rates and
charges."') (quoting Southern Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 119 Ala. 539, 558 (1898)).
381. See supra notes 106, 205-211 and accompanying text.
382. For a summary of the ICC's growing regulatory ambition, see Wilson, supra
note 5, at 98.
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understood as intrinsically dependent on the administrative bureaucracy
for such equal, non-discriminatory treatment. Without the bureaucracy,
the individual risked becoming the victim of other individuals, including
powerful corporations, in a railroad market that otherwise might dissolve
into a Hobbesian war of all against all,383 with the strong dominating the
384
weak and the strong ultimately suffering domination by the stronger.
Apparently, only the power of the administrative agency could combat
market disorder and protect us from Hobbes's dark vision of a world of
individuals run amok. As a consumer in the national transportation
market, each person was invited to see himself or herself as the
individual-as-supervised-and-protected-by-bureaucracy. Thus, the
individual awakened in the world of the post-Enlightenment paradigm
unavoidably bound to and dependent on markets supervised by
bureaucracies.
It is important to recall finally what the order imposed on
individuals in the market under the post-Enlightenment paradigm is not.
It is not and does not pretend to be a rationally persuasive moral order or
an objective, true, right order to which individuals-natural and
corporate-would assent under appropriate conditions. In the post-
Enlightenment era, it is assumed that there is no rationally persuasive,
objective, true, right order to which individuals will assent. It is
precisely because of this assumption that we require a competent neutral
bureaucracy to impose the order that we must have to survive in our
market-based society. The relative invisibility of bureaucratic power
combined with fictions about bureaucratic competence and the
"reasonableness" of the standards imposed by bureaucratic power may
help us to forget that it is in fact power that bureaucracies like the ICC
exercise when imposing order on markets. We survive in a Nietzschean
world where all is permitted in theory because the bureaucracy tells us
what is in fact permitted and what is in fact prohibited. Without the
generally invisible hand of bureaucratic power, it seems the outcome of
our nihilism would be chaos. If, therefore, nihilism has a happy ending,
bureaucratic power may be the reason. This shows again the key role of
bureaucracy in the post-Enlightenment paradigm, which grew out of an
essentially nihilistic set of premises about the impossibility of a
rationally persuasive moral theory after the Enlightenment. By
articulating and reinforcing the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the
Supreme Court's early ICC cases helped to establish the central role of
383. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
384. For examples of the Supreme Court's use of war metaphors and imagery to
describe the railroad market, see U.S. v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 564, 569
(1898).
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bureaucratic power in the then-emerging culture of bureaucratic
individualism.
V. CONCLUSION
In the years between 1887 and 1910, the Supreme Court faced the
challenge of interpreting the ICA and articulating the function of the new
ICC within our society. As this Article has shown, in responding to that
challenge, the Court drew on and gave shape to what I have called the
post-Enlightenment paradigm. Thus, the Court treated the people and
entities that the ICA regulated as individuals pursuing non-rational
individual interests and preferences in the market for railroad services.
The Court came to view the ICC as an administrative bureaucracy
charged with combating the inevitable tendency toward disorder in that
market. In the early years, the ICC policed the market, identifying and
discouraging overly aggressive behavior by individuals. After the
adoption of the Hepburn Act, the ICC assumed an increasingly market-
corrective role-imposing order by setting the prices that individuals
could charge in the market. Underlying this paradigmatic understanding
of the relationship between railroads, railroad users, and the ICC was the
Court's apparent conviction that there is no objective, true, universally
valid, rationally persuasive standard of conduct available to courts or
individuals. In particular, reasonable people, whether individuals or
courts, will not agree on what constitutes unreasonable or unjust conduct.
From this essentially nihilistic premise, it follows that individuals
pursuing their non-rational interests and preferences will interact in a
manner that breeds disorder unless an entity such as an administrative
bureaucracy imposes order on them.
Of course, the order that the bureaucracy imposes does not and
cannot reflect an objective, true, universally valid standard of conduct,
because, by hypothesis, such a standard does not exist. Thus, the sole
"rational" justification for any order the bureaucracy imposes is that it
will be preferable to the alternative, which is disorder. Although in
theory anything goes, in practice the ICC and other administrative
bureaucracies tell us what goes and what does not go. By ensuring order
that otherwise would not exist, bureaucracy provides nihilism's happy
ending. However, the price is a social structure consisting of individuals,
markets and bureaucracies in which the application of power ultimately
has no justification beyond our need for someone to maintain order.
Although this Article is the continuation of my earlier work on more
recent manifestations of the post-Enlightenment paradigm, its
conclusions are, nevertheless, preliminary in many respects. First, the
Article does not purport to provide a comprehensive account of how the
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post-Enlightenment paradigm insinuated itself into our way of
understanding our modem social scheme. Rather, it focuses on the
emergence of the paradigm in the Supreme Court's efforts to explain and
justify ICC supervision of consumers and providers of railroad services.
Much more could be said about how and why other institutions gradually
adopted the paradigm as a way of explaining and justifying personal
conduct and social arrangements. Second, the Article does not examine
the narrower question of how the paradigm shaped the Court's approach
to administrative law in the years after 1910. 1 expect to take up that
issue in a future article. My goal will be to show how we went from a
world in which the paradigm was novel to a world in which the paradigm
was normal and alternatives to the paradigm were almost
unimaginable-the world that I believe we inhabit today.
A third issue that this Article does not examine is the precise role or
status of the judiciary in the post-Enlightenment paradigm itself. The
judiciary plays an important role in my discussion, yet the paradigm does
not recognize the role or significance of the judiciary. Nelson has
suggested one possible solution to this problem, arguing that after the
Civil War, the federal judiciary itself increasingly adopted a
formalistic/bureaucratic outlook on legal issues. 385 Thus, in a sense,
supervision by the judiciary evolved into a form of bureaucratic
supervision. Whatever one makes of Nelson's argument, it is clear that a
more detailed examination of the function of courts under the paradigm
would be useful. At the same time, it is important not to overstate the
role of the courts in the saga of the ICC.
The Supreme Court clearly blunted some of the ICC's early
initiatives and delayed implementation of some of the ICC's policy
decisions. The Court's opinions denying the ICC rate-setting authority
provide a good example. Yet by implicitly relying on the paradigm to
explain and justify the function of the ICC, the Court provided a
rationale for enhancing the power of the administrative bureaucracy and
limiting the role of the judiciary in the administrative state. Indeed, the
Court itself seemed to endorse such a limited role for the judiciary in the
386Illinois Central case. In general, the Court renounced the authority to
second-guess ICC policy decisions and sent the message that lower
courts ordinarily should not attempt to override ICC decisions about
what conduct was unreasonable or undue. And if Vermont Yankee 387 and
385. NELSON, supra note 301, at 133-148.
386. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
387. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Chevron388 are any guide, it appears that the Court continues to renounce
any significant role as an arbiter of agency policy.
A final issue that I do not address in this Article and that I expect to
take up in future writings is the fundamental question whether the
nihilistic understanding of our moral situation that underlies the post-
Enlightenment paradigm is accurate. Here I do not simply point to the
interesting theoretical paradox that if the hardcore nihilist denies the
possibility of truth, then he or she cannot assert that nihilism is true.
Rather, I hope to address the more practical issue of whether it is still
possible to articulate an objectively true and valid, rationally persuasive
ethical framework within which a community can pursue a shared vision
of the good life. And following Alasdair Maclntyre, I expect to do this
389from an Aristotelian, teleological standpoint. I want to consider
whether it is still possible to imagine a world without individuals,
markets and bureaucracies and whether such a world might truly be
better than the world we have constructed for ourselves since 1887. I
want to consider, in other words, whether there might be a happier
ending than the one that administrative bureaucracies have seen fit to
provide for us.
388. Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
389. Maclntyre has spent much of the last twenty years attempting to revive the old
Aristotelian/Thomist approach to moral theory. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Plain
Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods, in THE MACINTYRE READER
136 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998). For my very preliminary comments on this issue, see
Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols, supra note 6, at 60-61.
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